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A common justification for recent interventions in 
consumer markets which ban or require particular contract 
terms or require firms to disclose information is that 
consumers are imperfectly informed respecting the trans-
actions they make� It is generally recognized, however,
that information is never perfect, and that the decision-
maker's task is therefore to characterize, in terms of 
the need for intervention, real world states intermediate 
between perfect information and perfect ignorance. These 
decisions are now made in what can politely be described 
as an impressionistic fashion because lawyers have no 
rigorous tools for responding to information problems. 
In recent years , economists have developed a variety of 
models that begin to explain the behavior of markets 
characterized by imperfect information. These models, 
however, have been almost inaccessible to lawyers be-
cause of their mathematical complexity. It is our aim 
in this paper to communicate to lawyers the insights 
relevant to law reform provided by the new "economics 
of information" }./ 
Thi1s task is sufficiently complex to justify a precis.
In Part I, we show that the normative objections to enforc-
ing the contracts of imperfectly informed consumers largely 
disappear if those contracts are made in competitive mar-
kets. Thus a decision to intervene, either to regulate 
contract terms or to require disclosure, cannot be sustained 
by a showing that an appreciable number of consumers are 
uninformed ; rather, the normative issue should be whether 
the existence of imperfect information has produced non-
competitive prices and terms. Because a decisionmaker cannot 
resolve this issue without an understanding of how markets 
characterized by imperfect information behave, Part II next 
describes the behavior of such markets. 
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In Part III, we illustrate how the economic theory 
assists a decisionmaker in deciding whether the existence 
of imperfect information has caused a mark�t to behave 
noncompetitively. Such an inquiry under the current state 
of the science would be expensive to conduct and impossi-
ble to answer precisely. Nevertheless, the theory generates 
criteria that will enable a decisionmaker now to determine 
in acceptably rigorous fashion whether information prob-
lems are sufficiently serious to justify an intervention. 
Part III concludes by setting forth these criteria. Part 
IV then relaxes two important assumptions on which the 
preceding argument partially rest, that the goods sold in 
any particular market are homogeneous, and that firms sell 
to all consumers under the same terms. Our object in Part 
IV is not to discuss the congeries of legal and economic 
problems raised by product heterogeniety and by firm dis-
crimination among consumers, but only to show that the anal-
ysis of Parts I-III and the policy suggestions which follow 
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generally hold under realistic assumptions. 
Finally, Part V discusses several interesting norm-
ative issues which interventions on the basis of imper-
feet information raise, and concludes by sketching out 
the argument's policy and institutional implications. 
Respecting these, the economics of information teaches 
that some methods of intervention are more likely to move 
markets toward competitive equilibria than others. It 
also suggests that courts, legislatures and administrative 
agencies have different capacities for responding effect-
ively to information problems. Part V thus makes several 
substantive and institutional suggestions for law reform 
once it has been decided that information problems justify 
some form of state response. 
Before beginning the analysis , we should stress its 
preliminary nature. We have two goals here, to show that 
information problems in consumer markets actually raise 
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the familiar but difficult issues of how the state can 
best ascertain and remedy market imperfections, and to 
offer some assistance in resolving these issues. Much 
more work remains to be done before the competitive state 
of markets can be characterized precisely, and the most 
effective remedies and remedial structures known with 
assurance. But it is past time to be moving in the right 
direction. Our paper should be viewed as an early sign-
post along this path. 
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I. The Relevance of Imperfect Information To 
Legal Intervention 
A. The Conventional Understanding 
The existence of imperfect information is thought 
to justify legal intervention, according to conventional 
understanding, because a consumer cannot contract in his 
own best interests without the data to rank the purchase 
h ' h' h 3/ c oices w ic markets offer.- This understanding implies
that the question a decisionmaker should ask is whether 
each (!·�· an idealized) consumer is sufficiently in-
formed to make purchase choices which maximize his own 
utility. For example, assume three firms sell a homo-
geneous product for $ 2 , $ 3  and $4. Mr. Jones pays $4 
because he is unaware of the lower prices. The existence 
of imperfect information prevented Jones from making the 
utility maximizing contract choice -- a purchase at the 
1 t ' 4/ owes price.- And any legal intervention should be
designed to enable each individual Jones to make such 
a choice , or otherwise to protect each Jones from the 
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consequences of making nonutility maximizing choices. 
The common methods of protecting Jones are to 
have the state determine his purchase terms or to re-
duce his costs of acquiring information � Courts deter-
mine purchase terms by refusing to enforce particular 
contract clauses, and legislatures determine purchase 
terms by prohibiting some clauses and requiring others. 
Two justifications for determining purchase terms follow 
.from the conventional analysis. First, if everyone has 
_
an identical preference ranking and a court or legisla-
ture knows better than market participants which purchase 
choices are consistent with this ranking, state deter-
mination of the terms will maximize each person's utility. 
Assume, for example, that all consumers prefer insurance 
against product caused injuries but are unable to under -
stand the language of warranty disclaimers imposing on 
them the risk of these injuries. A state prohibition 
of such disclaimers would then be optimal. 
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Second, a standard objection to intervening in 
markets, that individuals know their preferences better 
than outsiders do, becomes untenable when individuals 
are uninformed, and decisionmakers in consequence 
should be less constrained in substituting their view 
of what constitutes a fair exchange for the outcomes 
reached by private agreements. As an illustration, 
some consumers, unaware of the legal and personal con-
sequences of giving security, may mistakenly grant broad 
security interests when they would in fact prefer to 
pay high interest rates rather than bear the risk of 
harsh repossessions. In these circumstances, a court 
or legislature which believes that it is fair to limit 
6/
the scope of security interests that consumers can grant-
or to prevent repossessionswithout judicial procesJ.1should 
simply direct such outcomes; for the argument that the 
contracts to which consumers have agreed demonstrate con-
trary consumers preferences is factually incorrect. 
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Under the conventional view, however, the method of 
reducing information acquisition costs, other things equal, 
dominates the method of determining terms because reduc-
ing information costs best enables individuals to maximize 
their own utility. Since consumers seldom have identical 
preference rankings, external determination· of terms would 
rarely be optimal. Also, if public decisionmakers should 
act on their preferences for "fair" outcomes only if con-
sumers are uninformed, the state should initially attempt 
to create the conditions under which informed contract 
choices can be made. Because more consumers will become 
informed if information acquisition costs are reduced, 
reducing these costs is the preferable response to the 
problem of imperfect information.�loetermining terms is 
therefore a "second best" solution, to be used primarily 
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by courts, for courts cannot create and police disclosure 
schemes. Consistent with this analysis, much of the con-
sumer protection legislation of recent years requires 
firms to disclose information rather than contract on 
state supplied terms. 
B. Difficulties With The Conventional 
Understanding And The Appropriate 
Role Of Imperfect Information 
This conventional understanding respecting the rele-
vance to the law of imperfect information suffers from 
two related difficulties: it is often nondirective re-
specting the methods of and the appropriate occasions for 
legal intervention, and it wrongly focuses on individuals 
rather than on the markets in which they purchase. Re-
specting the former difficulty, consumer information acqui-
sition costs ("search costs") can be reduced in a variety 
of ways, all of which themselves impose costs on firms 
and consumers. The conventional view, however, generates 
-1 0-
no criteria by which to decide which methods of reducing 
search costs are "better" or "more effective" or "cost 
justified". Thus legislatures must choose without guid-
ance from among a congeries of potentially useful (and 
useless) regulations. 
Further, the conventional analysis inadequately. iden-
tifies when an intervention on the basis of imperfect 
information is ne.cessary and whether a needed intervention 
should require disclosure or determine contract terms, 
The most convenient way to answer the question which the 
conventional analysis makes relevant -- whether the 
"typical" consumer has enough information to make utility 
maximizing purchase choices is to draw inferences from 
levels of information held by actual consumers as a class. 
This is easy to do in the case of polar extremes. For 
example, if scarcely anyone is in fact informed, the 
"typical" consumer cannot be expected to be informed, 
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but if almost everyone is (or can be made) informed, 
the typical consumer is (or through disclosure legis­
lation will become) informed. 
Decisiorunakers actually encounter great difficulty 
in deciding whether the typical consumer has "enough" 
information, however, because the polar extremes of com-
plete or incomplete information seldom occur. A signifi­
can� number of informed consumers commonly exists in act-
ual markets prior to legal interventions, and disclosure 
legislation doesn't inform everyone. �/This suggests that 
" the facts" often do not illuminate the question which 
conventional analysis makes relevant. To perceive this 
difficulty more fully, consider whether a decisiorunaker 
should find that the typical consumer could inform himself 
at reasonable cost if 3 0 % , 45% , 6 0 %  or 75% of actual consumers 
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are (or could be made) informed. No current criterion 
directs a preference for any of these possibilities, 
except in so far as such a preference would follow from 
the presuppositions of a decisiorunaker as to how much 
effort consumers should commit to informing themselves. 
Thus if the decisiorunaker believes that people " ought" 
to work hard at making wise transactions, that 3 0 %  of 
persons presently know the facts demonstrates that the 
level of information is satisfactory because consumers 
can take care of themselves. Thus the conventional ana-
-lysis, which attempts to decide the need for and character 
of interventions on the basis of imperfect information 
by reference to the percentage of actually or potentially 
informed consumers, often in practice can given decision-
makers no guidance. The conventional view, that is, can� 
not tell how much information is " enough" . l
O/
The second difficulty with the conventional view 
is that it mistakenly focuses on individuals rather 
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than on the markets in which these individuals purchase. 
To perceive the nature of this mistake, it is useful first 
to observe that consumers differ in their shopping 
behavior. Some consumers consult a variety of information 
sources, such as newspapers, friends and consumer 
periodicals, visit several stores before purchasing and 
plan purchases carefully over long time periods. Other 
consumers, however, consult few or no information sources, 
visit only the store of purchase and do not seriously 
plan. But a third group, apparently larger than the 
first two, engages in moderate search. 1 1/
The presence of at least some consumer search in a 
market creates the possibility for what is called a 
" pecuniary externality"; persons who search, that is, 
sometimes can protect the nonsearchers from overreaching 
firms�This result can obtain because in mass trans-
actions it is usually too expensive for firms to 
distinguish among extensive, moderate and nonsearchers, 
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and it would often b e  too expensive to draft different 
contracts for each o·f these groups if they could conven-
iently be identified. Thus, if enough searchers exist, 
firms have incentives both to compete for their business 
and to offer the nonsearchers the same terms which the 
searchers receive. If the preferences of searchers are 
positively correlated with the preferences of nonsearchers, 
competition among firms for searchers could then protect 
all consumers�3/Therefore, the conventional analysis asks 
the wrong question -- whether an idealized individual is 
sufficiently informed to maximize his own utility. The 
appropriate normative inquiry instead is whether competition 
among firms for particular groups of searchers is, in any 
given market, sufficient to generate prices and terms which 
are utility maximizing for the nonsearchers. 
When the issue is so put, it is also possible to 
give decisionmakers more guidance in deciding when and 
how to intervene on the basis of imperfect information, 
- 15-
This is because the issue reduces to the roughly answerable 
question of whether the market in which a set of challenged
contracts were made is behaving competitively. The corn-
petitive .price is the lowest price a market can sustain and 
all consumers would, other things equal, prefer to purchase 
at the lowest price. Therefore, if enough searchers exist 
to generate a competitive price, all consumers who buy will 
make utility maximizing choices respecting price. To refer 
to the illustration above, if the competitive price were 
$2 and all firms charged it, Jonest purchase would maxi-
mize his utility even though he bought at the first store 
he visited and did not know the prices of any other firms. 
In addition, because there is now no reason to believe 
that consumers who search differ widely in their prefer-
ences respecting purchase terms from consumers who do not 
search, competition among firms for the business of those 
consumers who are "term conscious " would probably generate 
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contract clauses which are utility maximizing for non­
searchers :4/Recent economic models provide some assist-
ance in ascertaining when markets are behaving cornpeti-
tively in respect of prices and terms, and in devising 
methods of moving markets toward competitive equilibria. 
Therefore, it is to these models that we next turn. 
Before doing so, some preliminary observations 
should be made. Under current contract and conunercial 
1aw, the existence of imperfect information is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for legal intervention �What
is also required is that market outcomes be substantively
unfair. The argument to this point, however, shows that
imperfect information should constitute a sufficient
ground for intervention (cost of intervention problems
aside) . This is because an intervention on information
grounds should not be made unless a market is found to 
be behaving noncornpetitively; and in our society supra 
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competitive prices or terms are generally considered 
to be substantively unfair. On the other hand, no con-
sensus exists that the outcomes of competitive markets 
are always fair, and we take no position in this article 
on whether the state should regulate contract terms on 
grounds of substantive fairness when information prob-
lems are absent. 16/
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II. The Behavior of Markets Under Imperfect
Information
A. The Nature of the Analysis 
The study of economic problems uses both optimiz-
ing and equilibrium techniques. The· former technique 
focuses on individual actors. These actors are presumed 
to maximize or minimize some relevant measure -- individ-
uals maximize utility, firms minimize costs --.and the 
economists' task is to characterize the optimization 
strategies actors pursue, and to describe the results 
for these actors of pursuing such strategies. Equilibrium 
analysis focuses on the interaction of economic agents 
in markets. Economists use it to characterize the out-
comes markets are likely to generate when individual 
' l ' ' t' t t ' 
l?/E 
. 
actors pursue particu ar optimiza ion s ra egies.� qui-
librium analysis is essential when discussing information 
problems because the normative questions which should 
concern decisionmakers largely reduce to whether markets 
are or can be made competitive. 
In using equilibrium analysis, it is often helpful 
to model markets as games. The "players" are firms 
and consumers. Each player chooses an optimization 
strategy, such as to maximize profits or· minimize pur-
chase costs. "Solution concepts" then characterize the 
outcomes (equilibria) particular games generate when 
players pursue specified strategies. The solution con-
cept most frequently used today is the "Nash equilibrium". 
A system is at a Nash equilibrium if each player would 
optimize by continuing to pursue his present course of 
conduct given that all other players continue to pursue 
their present strategies. In such a case, no player 
has an incentive to alter his strategy; the system is 
' l  'b . 18/at an equi 1 rium. -
This abstract description can be illuminated by 
a relatively simple example. Consumers in a purely com-
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petitive market are presumed to have perfect information, 
face zero search costs, and desire to purchase at the 
lowest price. The only Nash equilibrium in such a mar-
ket is at the competitive price. To establish this con-
clusion, we shall initially observe that a situation in 
which firms charged different prices could not be an 
equilibrium. A firm which quoted a price higher than 
that of other firms would have no customers, because con-
sumers who knew the price each firm charged ·and who could 
costlessly travel from firm to firm would never buy at a 
price above the market minimum. The high price sellers 
thus would alter their strategy (by reducing prices to 
the market minimum or exiting) if the low price sellers 
continued to pursue their pricing strategies. Price dis-
persion therefore could not constitute a Nash equilibrium. 
Moreover, the only single price which would be an 
equilibrium would be the competitive price. Assume 
the market had reached this price. No firm would have an 
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incentiveto lower its price because the competitive 
price is at the minimum point of each f irm '·s average 
cost curve and price cuts below this point would con-
sequently yield losses . Nor would a firm have an in-
centive to raise its price -- if all other firms con-
tinued to charge the competitive price -- because this 
firm would have no customers . Perfectly informed con-
sumers would purchase from its competitors .19/ 
Part II B next describes model s  which illustrate 
Nash equilibria in markets characterized by imperfect 
information . These models ,  l ike the example j ust given , 
relate the optimiz ation strategies of consumers and 
firms to the outcomes markets generate . Because there 
unfortunately is l ittle hard data respecting how con� 
sumers and firm optimize under conditions of uncertainty , 
Part II B thus spends some time describing and analyz ing 
the assumptions currently made respecting such optimiza-
tion strategies . 
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B .  The Behavior of Markets Characterized 
by Imperfect Information 
1 . Common Features of " Search Equilibrium 
Mode l s "  
Th h . 1 . b . d 1 d . 
201 e searc equi i rium mo e s iscussed belo..;;r-share 
several assumptions respecting firms , products and con-
sumers .  Firms maximi ze profits , but pursue relatively 
pas sive strategie s .  Each firm , that is , sets a price , 
charges this price to each consumer , waits to see who buys , 
and alters its price when this would increase profits . 
Firms , however , do not advertise . These firms all sell 
a.homogeneous good on terms which differ , when they �iffer ,
only on price . We shall consider the probable e ffects of 
relaxing all of these assumptions later , but for now they 
are necessary to the analysis . 21/ 
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Consumers , these models assume , are interested 
primarily in prices ( the goods being homogeneous ) and 
act to maximize expected uti l ity . Each consumer before 
entering the market decides , on the basis of his income , 
tastes and alternative opportunities , what is the maximum 
or " limi t "  price he wil l  pay . Search equilibrium models 
typically assume , for expositional convenience , that 
all consumers in a market have a common " limit price " . 
This common limit price may be thought of as the 
monopoly price because it i s  the price a monopolist 
would charge were he confronted with a set of consumers· 
who would pay this price but no more .221Finally , consumers 
become informed only by visiting firms ; they do not 
read advertisements ( formally there are no advertisements )  
or consult other information sources . The effect of 
re laxing this assumption also is considered below . 
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Because f irms are assumed t o  maximiz e  profits , a 
Nash equilibrium would occur only i f  no firm could in-
crease profits by changing its price . A further impor-
tant equilibrium condition of search models is that no 
firms desire to enter or exit the market . This i s  cap-
tured mathematically by assuming that in equilibrium all 
firms earn zero profi ts . 
2 . Sequential Search Models in Which 
Consumers Know the Price Distribution 
23/ 
Many early search modelS-assumed that consumers 
shop according to a sequential strategy . A consumer 
who uses this strategy visits f irms in sequence accord-
ing to the rule that search should continue until the 
marginal cost of further search is greater than or equal 
to the marginal gain (the gain being measured by the 
likelihood that an additional store vi s it wi ll produce 
a lower price ) . The pri ce for each consumer at 
which the marginal cost of further search j ust equals 
- 2 5 -
the marginal gain is referred to as the consumer•s 
"reservation price " .  It is the maximum price at which 
the consumer will purchase (provided that it is less 
than or equal to his l imit price ) . Because the expected 
gain which each consumer perceives search to yield is a 
function of that consumer ' s  estimate of the probability 
of finding various lower prices , the consumer•s optimal 
search strategy cannot be characterized precisely with-
out describing how the consumer incorporates his subj ect-
ive view of the actual price distribution into the calcu-
lation of his reservation price . The optimization prob-
lem which characteriz ing such a strategy entails , however , 
presently cannot be solved if the consumer is assumed not 
to know the distribution of prices he faces . Thus search 
equilibrium model s  commonly make the very strong (�·�·
very unrealistic ) assumption that when consumers decide 
how much search to engage in , they know the overall price 
distribution but not the specific prices each firm charges . 
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A brief description of the s ingle price equil ibria 
which can obtain is su fficient to indicate the policy 
implications of model s  which assume that consumers 
searching sequentially know the true price distribution 
but not the identity of the firms charging the prices . 
Let all consumers face positive search costs . In these 
c ircumstance s ,  the only equilibrium is at the common limit 
or monopoly price ( "PL " )  •
24/If the market were at a s ingle
price Po le�s than PL ' a firm could raise its price by
-some (perhaps small )  amount without losing customers . A 
consumer in this case would compare the gain of purchasing 
from a competitor who continued to charge the l ower "old " 
price with the cost of switching ,  and if the price rise 
-2 7 -
was made smaller than the cost to any consumer of 
switching, no consumer would switch. The only price at 
which this seller strategy fails is PL, for a firm
which charged more than the limit price would make no 
sales. Thus only the monopoly price can be a Nash equi-
librium. At any lower price, a firm has an incentive to 
alter its strategy -- raise its price -- if other firms 
continue to pursue their strategy -- to charge the same 
price. 
If the market were at the monopoly price, no firm 
would have an incentive to lower its price, Consumers, 
the models assume, learn a store's price only by visiting 
it. A consumer thus would not switch to the single price 
cutting firm because the probability of finding the one 
firm charging less than PL' when many firms exist, is too
low to make switching an optimal consumer strategy. Thus 
if the market price were at PL' it would stay there �
-28-
The monopoly price would not be an equilibrium, 
however, if an appreciable number of consumers could
search costlessly, In such a case, firms may increase 
profits by cutting prices or reduce profits by raising 
them. For example, were a market to reach the monopoly 
price, it would pay a given firm to cut prices� since 
consumers know the price distribution, they would realize 
that a price cutter exists, and those who could costlessly 
search would find and switch to this firm. As a firm 
could increase profits by cutting prices, the· monopoly 
price could not be an equilibrium. Further, if a 
substantial number of consumers faced zero search costs, 
only the competitive price would be an equilibrium. Let 
the market be at a price less than PL. Any firm which
raised its price would lose those of its customers who 
could search costlessly, for they would switch to firms 
whose prices had not changed. Thus if a large number 
of consumers faced zero search costs, it would never 
pay a firm to raise prices if its rivals had not raised 
their prices. And we have already seen that it would 
pay a firm to cut prices if its rivals failed to follow 
suit. The price cutting strategy only fails when the 
market is at the competitive price; at this point, each 
firm is operating at the point where price equals mini-
mum average cost, so no further price cuts would occur. 
When a substantial portion of consumers face zero search 
costs, then, the only single price equilibrium a market 
can sustain is the competitive equilibrium because if 
the market reached the competitive price, no firm would 
have an incentive to charge more or less.26/ 
This conclusion unfortunately seems useless to 
policy makers. In the r�al world, all consumers face 
positive search costs, and no legislative action could 
reduce anyone's costs to zero. 
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If we depart from pure theory, however, the analysis 
is suggestive of appropriate policies. Search equilibrium 
models commonly assume that sellers do not advertise.27/ 
Advertising, however, increases the chance that switching 
from firm to firm would be an optimal strategy for con-
sumers to follow, and that price cuts would thus be 
optimal for firms. To understand this function of 
advertising, assume that a market were at the monopoly 
price. A firm then cuts its price and runs newspaper 
advertisements. As consumers in consequence could find 
this firm relatively cheaply, some of them may patronize
it. Advertising thus tends to drive prices downward and 
thereby prevents the existence of monopoly equilibria. 
Because interventions to cure information problems are 
often expensive, these search equilibrium models therefore 
suggest that when price advertising is common, decision-
makers should be cautious when deciding whether to 
intervene on the basis of imperfect information. A more 
- 31-
detailed discussion of this and other policy implications 
is found in Parts III and V. 
The models this section discusses have two significant 
limitations as guides to P?licy makers. First, the
assumption that consumers know the true price distribution 
but not the identity of the firms charging each price is 
very strong. When a set of models has not been verified 
empirically and some of its specifications seem implausible, 
the conclusions it supports should be taken as suggestions 
to consider, not directions to follow. Second, no models 
which presuppose that consumers know the price distribu-
tion have plausibly characterized the conditions which 
can sustain multiple price equilibria. Real world markets, 
however, frequently are characterized by price dispersion. 
Thus the search equilibrium models this section describes 
often will give decisionmakers little help in evaluating 
actual market outcomes. 
-32-
28/ 
we thus turn to our own modeL"°which makes seemingly 
more plausible assumptions respecting how consumers 
search and what they know about the prices they face. 
This model in,consequence,is somewhat more helpful in 
answering the question whether particular real world 
price distributions are close to the competitive ideal. 
what is also encouraging is that it supports policy pre-
scriptions similar to the ones to which the models just 
discussed lead, thus suggesting that these disparate 
theoretical analyses capture some essential features 
of market "reality". 
3 . A Fixed Sample Size Model When Consumers 
Do Not Know The Price Distribution 
This model assumes that consumers are ignorant of 
29/the price distribution before they begin to search. � 
Economists generally suppose in this case that consumers 
30/ 
also use a pure sequential strategy-:- A simple illustra-
tion captures the argument. Let all prices in a market 
cluster around a point. A consumer who follows a fixed 
sample size strategy will decide before shopping how many 
stores to visit. If he has decided on a sample of five, 
he will visit all five stores although, in this illustra-
tion, his search would quickly reveal little price diver-
sity. A sequential searcher by contrast would probably 
stop searching after visiting only a few firms because 
he correctly infers that further search will reveal similar 
prices. The sequential searcher would purchase at the 
same price as the fixed sample size searcher, but· at a 
lower cost (because he visits fewer stores). The sequen-
tial strategy thus dominates the fixed sample size strat-
egy because it enables consumers to make better use of 
the information search reveals. 
- 3 4-
Recent analyses suggest, however, that consumers 
could rationally include nonsequential elements in their 
search strategies. Initially, consumers who search se-
quentially against an unknown price distribution may make 
more costly errors than consumers who keep to preset 
31/ 
samples.�sequential searchers can mistake the signifi-
cance of a price similarity which initial store visits 
may reveal and stop searching too soon, or can mistake 
the significance of an initial price diversity and search
-longer than the actual price distribution warrants. On 
the other hand, consumers who stay within preset sample 
sizes seldom radically over or underinvest in search. 
Further, experiments suggest that consumers come much 
closer to obtaining the optimal payoff their strategies 
permit when they used fixed samples rather than search 
32/ 
sequentially.� Risk averse consumers ignorant of the 
price distribution may therefore rationally incorporate 
fixed sample size elements into their search strategy; 
-35-
for this is likely to produce "reasonable " prices, as 
measured by available market choices, with little risk 
of incurring excess costs. Also, some consumers search 
because they enjoy shopping. As a sequential strategy 
is useful only for minimizing search costs -- the se-
quence could end at one store visit if that visit reveals 
a very low price -- consumers who shop partly for pleasure 
may visit a preset number of stores. Finally, when fixed 
costs to search exist, visiting several stores may be 
optimal. For example, if a consumer's major expense is 
getting to the shopping district, he may choose to visit 
a preset number of stores when he arrives there because 
the more store visits he makes the lower becomes his cost 
of visiting each store. 
Intuition, however, suggests that consumers in fact 
used mixed strategies. Because of the advantages of a 
fixed sample size strategy, especially when the price 
distribution is unknown, consumers probably do create and 
intend to exhaust a preset sample of stores before pur-
chasing. These samples, however, are flexible; a consumer 
who sees at the outset of his search a price which his 
impressionistic expectation suggests is a "bargain" may 
buy at that price, even though this means that he has not 
exhausted his sample. 
All essential features of such a mixed strategy are 
captured in a model which assumes that consumers set and 
keep within preset samples, but that for some consumers 
the sample size is one while for other consumers it is 
greater than one. This is because if consumers actually 
follow mixed strategies, some of them, in any given mar-
ket, can be expected to visit only one store while others 
are likely to visit more than one store. The evidence, 
moreover, is consistent with the existence of mixed 
strategies. In every market studied, a considerable 
percentage of consumers but not all visit two or more 
-37 -
33/ 
stores-:- Thus we make the weak C!·�· realistic) assump-
tion that consumers pursue mixed strategies, which we 
capture with the mathematically convenient metaphor that 
consumers use a fixed sample size strategy with some 
samples equalling one. 
The model also rests on two relatively weak assump-
tions respecting the way sample sizes are chosen: sample 
34/ 
size varies inversely with the cost of search and directly 
with the gains from search. These gains includ� the plea-
sure which shopping may bring and the lower prices it may 
reveal. Respecting the latter, because greater price or 
quality variation may exist for higher priced than for 
lower priced goods, more search -- the visiting of more 
stores -- should occur for such goods; and more search in 
fact occurs. 39/ 
Given all of the foregoing assumptions, the model 
yields three potential equilibria: (1) A single price 
equilibrium at the competitive price (although all consumers 
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face positive search costs); (2) A cluster of prices at 
the competitive price, with other prices spreading up to 
the monopoly price; ( 3 )  A continuous price distribution 
bounded on the upper end by the monopoly price. Which 
equilibrium obtains in any given market is a function of 
the number of consumers in that market who visit more than 
one firm, and the size of the samples these consumers set. 
The explanation of the first eauilibrium is similar 
to the explanations developed above. Let the market be 
at a single price "Po" greater than the competitive price 
"Pa". A given firm in these circumstances could increase 
profits if it lowered its price by some (perhaps small) 
amount. This firm would continue to get its share of 
those consumers who visit only one store, but it would 
also get every customer whose sample included two or more 
stores and who visited the price cutter; for such "compari-
son shoppers" buy at the lowest price they see. Because 
when some consumers comparison shop at least one firm 
could increase profits by undercutting Po, this price 
could not be an equilibrium; a situation in which only 
Po is charged would be unstable. The price cutting 
strategy only fails at the competitive price because 
average costs then are minimized and further price cuts 
would be unprofitable. Thus when some consumers compari-
son shop, the only single price which could be an equili­
brium would be Pa, the competitive price. Further, if 
the market reached Pa and many consumers were comparison 
shoppers, no firm could increase profits by raising its 
price. Such a firm would get only those consumers who 
visit one store; for consumers who visit two or more 
firms would not buy from the high price firm. In conse-
quence, this firm could charge as much as PL' but if too 
few nonshoppers exist, it still would earn no more (and 
perhaps less) profit than if it had continued to charge 
Pa. Therefore, when a sufficient number of consumers al-
ways visit more than one store, the competitive price is 
the only equilibrium. 
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This result differs from the result described above 
where a competitive equilibrium could not exist unless some 
consumers could search costlessly because some consumers 
in this model continue to search regardless of the price 
information which store visits reveal. Consumers probably 
consider the possibility of price variation in setting 
their samples. But the reasons which lead consumers to 
include nonsequential elements in their search strategies 
cause some consumers to visit all stores in these samples 
notwithstanding that they may continually see similar 
prices. Because some consumers always comparison shop, 
·firms which cut prices could always be rewarded and firms
which raise prices could always be punished. The extent 
to which the prospect of reward or punishment influences 
firm behavior depends on the ratio of comparison shoppers 
to the total number of shoppers in the market. If that 
ratio is sufficiently great, we have seen, the market will 
generate a competitive equilibrium. 
If not enough comparison shoppers to support a 
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competitive equilibrium exist, but a substantial number 
of them are present, the market will sustain an equili-
brium with a "mass point " -- a cluster of prices -- at 
the competitive price and a price spread up to PL, the
monopoly price. A mass point above Pa, the competitive 
price, could not exist for reasons similar to those just 
discussed; when many firms charge a single price above 
Pa, a given firm could increase 'profits by cutting its 
price. But a mass point can exist at Pa because it is the 
competitive price; firms whose prices are forced down to 
Pa would not find it profitable to charge prices below 
it. Not all firms, however, would be at this price. In 
this second case, enough consumers who visit only one 
store exist to make it profitable for some firms to 
"specialize" in selling to these uninformed consumers at 
supra competitive prices. The last result this model 
generates is that if a small number of consumers compari-
son shop, equilibrium entails a continuous price distri-
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bution. The upper bound of the distribution is PL' the
monopoly price. Its range varies inversely with the 
number of comparison shoppers and their shopping intensi,.. 
ties, so that, when very few consumers shop, prices will 
bunch up toward PL.
The three outcomes of this model can be precisely 
characterized mathematically. Let Al the number of 
consumers who visit only one store; An the number of 
consumers who visit more than one store; n the number 
of stores each comparison shopper visits; F = each firm•s 
'\ 
fixed costs (including a return on investment); s = the 
"capacity constraint ", or level of output which minimizes 
/\
average cost; PL = the common limit price; p = each firm's
marginal cost. A competitive equilibrium can exist if 
f'" . An >- \ - <V'"' tS and only if A\-\-A'h -''-.YL- r) an equilibrium 
with a mass point at the competitive price can exist if 
h� >'�>.� 
and only if A\ 'IY\�" Jl\\,-'f) A\.'fA'f\; and a continuous
price distribution can exist if and only ifli{�A,� .L. \S�L�� 
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Because consumers visit {irms to compare prices, this 
model suggests that if a market is not behaving competitively 
the state should consider methods of reducing the costs of 
comparison shopping in that market; for as those costs de-
cline, n, An and in consequence the likelihood of competi-
tive behavior should increase. Further, this model also 
does not incorporate advertising. But it suggests, as do 
the models described above, that advertising is quite use-
ful in prodacing competitive behavior. A consumer who 
examines three advertisements has sampled three stores, at 
least as regards price. Finally, this model may be useful in 
state intervention decisions. All of these policy impli-
cations are discussed in greater detail in Parts III-V below. 
III. Deciding· When To Intervene: An Illustration
and Its Implications 
This section illustrates how the economic analysis 
can assist a decisionmaker in answering the relevant norma-
tive question, whether imperfect information has caused 
a market to behave noncompetitively. It will be useful 
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to begin by showing how a decisionmaker could in 
principle used the fixed sample size model to answer 
this question precisely. Assume that our hypothetical 
decisionmaker observes all prices in a market for elec-
tric clothes dryers to cluster around some point. The 
fixed sample size model suggests that the market is at 
a competitive equilibrium. The concept of a "cluster", 
however, is vague. The model also predicts that when 
few comparison shoppers exist, the price distribution 
will bunch toward the monopoly price. When market 
prices seem close to each other, therefore, the decision-
maker could be observing either the competitive outcome 
or an outcome approaching the monopoly price. 
Let the highest observed price be $450. The decision-
maker could sample consumers to ascertain their limit 
prices. If the sample mean is well above the highest 
observed price -- say it is $700 -- the market is competi-
tive. Because at least one seller who could charge the 
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monopoly price (PL) would do so, $450, the highest ob- '
served price, could not be PL. But as the model allows
for no mass points -� price clusters -- above the competi-
tive price, the observed cluster must be the competitive 
price. If the sample mean, however, is in the neighbor-
hood of the highest observed price, the decisionrnaker 
would have to use the formula that a competitive equilibrium 
can obtain if and only if 
Ao > \- r 
A\ 'r-flM - RYl-f5 . 
To illustrate how this could be done, we shall ini-
tially let X =A\ \-/\-'(\ Then X is the ratio of com� 
parison shoppers people who visit two or more stores --
to the total consumers in the market, If a market is 
competitive, a firm�s price can be represented by the equation 
·--\(_ 0i_ L f?71' -==-1? ., -r Now let the decisionrnaker ob,.. 
serve a standard markup on variable costs in this market 
of one hundred percent. 
Substituting, Unless 
marginal cost rises steeply, average variable cost can 
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be a proxy for marginal cost, and it is easier to ascer-
tain. Assume that the average variable cost observed 
was $200 per dryer. Finally, the sample mean of limit 
prices, let us say, is $500. Thus PL ($500) = 2. 5p
(2. 5 x $200). Substituting in the equation 
v > i _L> \ -� > \- v ·=. . 361get f\- '-n � _ � _ ":2\"""�5. Thus
i\: t' �.Sy--y \·Sf 
for x, we 
if one 
third or more of the persons who purchase electric 
clothes dryers visit more than one store, the observed 
price distribution would cluster around the competitive 
price. Empirical evidence indicates, moreover, that 
fifty percent or more of the purchasers of items such 
as clothes dryers visit two or· more stores before buying,37/
Since consumers can also obtain comparative price infor-
mation by observing advertisements, this evidence actually 
understates the amount of comparison shopping which occurs. � 
Thus if the illustrative data respecting limit prices, 
markups and average variable cost are even approximately 
accurate, a decisionmaker who saw a cluster of prices in 
an electric clothes dryer market could conclude that the 
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market was competitive. 
If the decisionmaker were instead to observe a cluster 
of prices with some prices well above it, his task would be 
easier. The fixed sample size model allows no mass points 
to occur except at the competitive price. Therefore, the 
decisionmaker would know that the cluster represented the 
competitive price. By comparing the number of prices in 
the cluster with the total number of prices obtaining, 
and their respective distances from the cluster, he could 
evaluate the competitive state of the market. 
This exercise teaches several valuable lessons .• 
Initially, despite the apparent precision of the analysis, 
the exercise shows that a real world decisionmaker would 
encounter great difficulty in precisely characterizing 
a market's competitive state. It would be quite difficult 
to ascertain limit prices accurately by sampling. The 
highest prices consumers report they would pay may differ 
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substantially from the highest prices they in fact would 
pay because consumers may weigh the costs and potential 
gains of purchases differently in hypothetical and real 
situations. Further, methodologically sound samples 
would have to be large, and for this and other reasons 
39/ 
would be expensive to obtain-;- Also, if a market contains 
firms which vary widely in size, the "representative" 
markup and average variable cost may not approximate 
reality closely, In addition, as Part IV shows, the 
existence of product heterogeniety and possible firm 
discrimination among �onsumers can greatly complicate the
analysis. Finally, a decisionmaker would have to decide 
which firms whose prices he is observing are actually 
in the market that he is evaluating. The antitrust laws 
make the question of market definition germane, but experi-
ence there teaches that the question is also hard. To summarize, 
inexpensively obtained and precise answers to the question 
whether the existence of imperfect information has caused 
given markets to behave noncompetitively will seldom be 
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available in real cases. 
The illustration of how a hypothetical decision-
maker could apply the fixed sample size model neverthe-
less demonstrates that markets are likely to be much 
better behaved in the face of imperfect information than 
is commonly supposed. Under relatively plausible assump-
tions respecting costs and consumer preferences, that 
illustration showed that a market may behave competitively 
if as many as two thirds of the consumers in it only know 
the prices they themselves pay. And if· fewer consumers 
than these are informed, the same assumptions would sup-
port a conclusion that many firms are still charging the 
competitive price. Thus the fixed sample size model, as 
well as the sequential search models discussed earlier, 
suggest that decisionmakers should be cautious in imposing 
expensive-disclosure requirements and that close cases 
should be resolved against intervention. 
- s o -
The analysis in Part II and the illustration just 
set forth are also useful to actual decisionmakers 
because they suggest that certain facts are more consis-
tent with the presence of competitive behavior than with 
its absence. These facts are: 
(a), If prices cluster, a market is likely to be at 
a competitive or a monopolistic equilibrium. A price 
cluster accompanied by the presence of a substantial 
number of comparison shoppers (for example, one 
third or more of total consumers in that market) 
is more consistent with the former outcome. 
(b) A price cluster with a few prices above it is 
also more consistent with a competitive outcome than 
a monopoly outcome. 
(c) If price advertising is common, a market is 
unlikely to be at a monopoly equilibrium; the "best 
case" for intervention cannot then be made. This 
conclusion is suggested by the sequential search 
models discussed above. To illustrate the point, 
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assume that prices had clustered around the monopoly 
price, advertising is common and consumers often observe 
two or more ads. In these circumstances, a firm could 
increase profits by cutting its price and advertising 
the cut. Because the firm was already advertising, the 
marginal cost of communicating information about the 
price cut would be small, and because some consumers 
would observe the contrast between this price and others, 
the firm's business would increase. The monopoly price 
thus would not be an equilibrium. The fixed sample 
size model also implies that the presence of price 
advertising correlates positively with the absence of 
a monopoly equilibrium, since such advertising reduces 
the costs of comparison shopping. 
(d) If comparison shopping is convenient, the 
likelihood of a competitive equilibrium obtaining is 
enhanced. The costs of such shopping vary 
inversely with the costs of making comparisons. 
And these latter costs will be lower if the methods 
of quoting prices or commonly used terms are stand-
ardized, because it is easier to compare like things 
- 5 2 -
and because consumers can use the knowledge obtained 
about prices and terms in one transaction conven-
iently to understand others. Thus if prices and 
terms in a market are quoted in standard and relatively 
clear fashion, the market, other things equal, is 
more likely than not to be competitive. 
(e) As is implicit in the foregoing analysis, and 
as Part IV next makes clear, competition is more 
likely when sellers cannot conveniently discriminate 
among consumers on the basis of relative knowledge 
or sophistication. 
Therefore, a decisionmaker observing a market in which 
price advertising is conunon, prices cluster, comparison 
shopping seems relatively inexpensive and firm discrimina-
tion among consumers is quite difficult to practice 
should conclude that no information problems exist. 
An illustrative application of these criteria may 
be drawn from one of the few markets for which data 
�s3-
exists, the market for financing consumer purchases 
of new cars. A state by state survey of finance charges 
revealed that the median range between the lowest and 
highest annual percentage rates ("APR") quoted for 
financing cars varied from 2% in the lowest variance 
state to 7% in the highest variance state, with 5% 
40/ 
being the most common state figure:- A more recent but 
less extensive survey suggested that the 2% range is 
41/ 
becoming common:- Thus prices cluster in this market. 
Also, an appreciable number of consumers apparently 
do search. Another study reported that of the consumers 
who purchased cars and household durables on credit be-
cause they lacked the resources to make cash purchases, 
30% and 20%, respectively, consulted alternative credit 
sources. Because this measure did not consider search 
within source types -- how many banks visited -- the 
authors suggest that it "may have significantly under-
42/ 
estimated the amount of search. "- Further, prices are 
quoted in a fashion which facilitates comparisons -- the 
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APR. Respecting the two other criteria, price advertis-
ing in local markets does not seem uncommon, and while 
43/ 
there are sometimes allegations of discrimination--; finance· 
rates seem generally to segment along risk lines, All 
of this suggests, in the absence of hard contrary data, 
that the auto loan market is presently competitive as 
regards price, and that such regulations as usury laws 
are unnecessary. This method of analysis, it must be 
admitted, is plainly rough, but it is focused on the right 
issue -- how markets behave; it is grounded in rigorous 
.
theory; it is easily as precise as inquiries currently 
44/ 
conducted in similar fields, such as antitrust�and as 
our understanding of how markets behave under conditions 
of imperfect information deepens, it can be made more 
precise still.45/
IV. Deciding When To Intervene Under Relaxed
Assumptions: Further Implications and
Limitations
Search equilibrium models make two relatively strong 
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assu·mptions: ( l) Goods are homogeneous; ( 2 )  Firms do 
not discriminate among consumers on the basis of knowledge 
or sophistication. In Part IV, we discuss the implications 
of r�laxing these assumptions for the decision to intervene. 
A .  Quality and Term Heterogeniety 
There is a common taxonomy of product heterogeniety: 
46/ 
' th " h" or "experi' ence" goods. A products are ei er searc 
search good is one whose salient characteristics the 
consumer can learn before purchase {by direct observation) ;  
an experience good is one whose salient characteristics can 
only be learned after purchase (by actual use) . Price 
and terms , in this lexicon, are search characteristics 
because the consumer can learn of them before buying 
while some aspects of performance -- automobile seat 
comfort during a long drive -- are experience character-
istics because· they can only be learned through use. 
It will be helpful to discuss search and experience 
goods separately. 
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1 .  Search Goods Generally 
The fixed sample size model in principle applies 
to markets of heterogeneous search goods because such 
markets are usually decomposable into roughly homogeneous 
subsets. Consider, for example, a radio sold in two and 
three knob versions. Whether each version is priced 
competitively is again largely a function of the ratio of 
comparison shoppers to total shoppers for that version. 
However, goods can differ along several quality dimensions. 
The two knob version thus may be more durable but less 
precise than the three knob version. If products never-
theless segment into classes recognizable both to consumers 
and firms and if consumers primarily shop within quality 
classes, the effect of imperfect information on the state 
of competition in each class can be examined in the rough 
manner we have described. Products, moreover, often do 
segment in this way: beers are premium or ordinary·, wines 
estate bottled or commune , cars compact or full size. And 
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consumers do seem primarily to search within quality 
47/ 
classes.� In markets of heterogeneous search goods,
therefore, investigations of the state of competition 
would be more costly and less exact than in markets 
where homogeniety prevails, but the criteria developed 
above would nevertheless be helpful. 
2. Contract Terms 
The discussion to this point has implicitly assumed 
that a market (or market subset) which is competitive on 
price is also competitive in respect of purchase terms. 
This assumption may be too strong. To perceive this, let 
all firms insert in their sales contracts a particular 
48/ 
term -- say an accelleration clause -- which can impose 
substantial costs on consumers. Firms, however, "conceal" 
this term by using fine print and complex legal language. 
In these circumstances, the "true" price to consumers 
exceeds the nominal, purchase price, but consumers may 
respond only to this latter price. If enough consumers 
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comparison shop, the market would reach equilibrium at 
the nominal, competitive price. Consumers, however, 
would suffer a welfare loss; they would be paying a 
higher "true" price than they would have paid if the 
clause at issue were "disclosed", for the nominal, 
competitive price does not reflect the costs the term 
shifts to consumers. We have so far neglected this 
problem because we assume that when a sufficient number 
of consumers comparison shop to generate a competitive 
price equilibrium, enough consumers would be "term 
conscious" to prevent the market from reaching a monopoly 
equilibrium for important terms. Put another way, if 
enough consumers comparison shop to make it profitable 
for firms to compete on price and quality, firms also are 
likely to compete on terms. This justification for equat-
ing terms with prices is of course unavailing if a par-
- ticular market is not a competitive equilibrium on price. 
But then intervening to produce enough comparison shop-
ping so that a competitive price equilibrium obtains 
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should resolve the term problem. 
The equation of term competition with price c mpeti-
tion nevertheless is not completely satisfactory because 
the overlap between consumers conscious of price and 
quality and those conscious of terms may be imperfect. 
This lack of correspondence may result from differences 
in taste -- some persons simply dislike learning about 
their contracts -- and from differences in cost. Evaluat-
ing terms is more costly than evaluating prices or search 
character istics such as color, size or fit ; some comparison 
shoppers in consequence may devote little time to examining 
terms. Further, in the absence of formal analysis (which 
we p�an later to make) it cannot be said that term corn-
petition occurs in precisely the same way as price competition. 
These difficulties suggest that additional criteria 
are required to guide the decision to intervene when terms 
are at issue. A monopoly equilibrium provides the best 
case for an intervention ; and it occurs when firms do not 
compete to give consumers better terms, but instead are 
aware of consumer ignorance and actively exploit it so 
that firms get the most favorable terms possible given 
consumers ' tastes, resources and alternative opportunities.49/
50/ 
A market can be considered rnonopolistiC-for any term 
which all or almost all firms use if the following 
criter ia are satisfied : ( 1 )  The market is not price com-
petitive. Because it is more costly for consumers to 
search for terms than for prices or some aspects of 
quality, if too few price searchers exist to generate 
a competitive (or almost competitive) price structure, 
too few term searchers may exist to generate a non-
monopolistic term structure; ( 2 )  Following the fourth 
criterion developed above, the term at issue always ap-
pears in arcane legal language and fine or otherwise in-
conspicuous pr int. If the market is price competitive 
but the second criterion is met, a monopolistic outcome 
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for any term should be presumed to occur if a substantial 
portion (more than one third) of the comparison shoppers 
are not " term conscious. " Basing a finding of monopoly 
on a much lower percentage of uninformed consumers than 
this may lead to serious errors because in our view it 
seems unlikely that markets which are competitive on 
price would be �onopolistic on terms. 
3 . Experience Goods 
Search equilibrium models assume that consumers can 
evaluate all relevant aspects of a product before pur-
chase ; the equilibria these models characterize relate 
to known characteristics, particularly the price. As 
consumers cannot evaluate experience characteristics 
before purchase, the models thus appear to say little 
about markets for experience goods. This, however, 
understates the utility of the analysis. Markets for 
some experience goods behave as if they were markets for 
search goods and the markets for many other experience 
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goods are unlikely to work in fundamentally different 
ways. 
Respecting the former, experience goods can be 
distinguished by frequency of purchase. A consumer 
wanting to buy milk, for example, can become familiar 
with the experience aspects -- taste and texture -- of 
different brands in less than a week. Therefore, 
frequently purchased experience goods in fact are search 
goods in that consumers know (or can quickly learn) all 
aspects of quality before purchase. Decisionmakers can 
ascertain the competitive state of such markets in the 
fashion previously described. 
Current search equilibrium models, however, are at 
best suggestive of the conditions associated with compe-
titive equilibria in markets for infrequently purchased 
experience goods . Such equilibria are likely to be largely 
functions of the ratio of knowledgeable consumers to total 
consumers in a market, and an appropriate way for the state 
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to facilitate their occurrence probably is to reduce 
the costs of comparison shopping. But until the under-
standing of experience goods advances, search equilibrium 
models will shed relatively little light on the question 
when interventions in experience goods markets on the 
basis of imperfect information are justified. 
B. Discrimination Among Consumers 
Our model assumed that each firm charged the same 
price and provided the same quality to all of its cus­
tomers. Thus when firms competed for the business of 
comparison shoppers, nonsearchers necessarily were bene-
fitted. But if firms discriminate among customers on 
the bases of knowledge or sophistication, this pecuniary 
externality would vanish i firms would "exploit" non-
searchers by charging them higher prices or providing 
them with lower quality than would be offered to compari-
son shoppers. It will be useful , in discussing this 
possibility , to distinguish between "mass" and "individ-
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ualized" transactions. In the former, firms cannot 
conveniently learn the characteristics of individual 
consumers. The efficiencies of mass transactions lie 
in the existence of a very high ratio of customers to 
sales persons and in such transactions being conducted 
rapidly. Retail sales of relatively low priced items 
afford the best illustration. "Individualized " trans­
actions are characterized by considerable personal 
contact between firm representatives and customers 
and commonly involve bargaining over price and product 
"features". The paridigm is the sale of a new car. 
1 . Mass Transactions 
In mass transactions, discrimination by individual 
firms among their customers seldom occurs because firms 
cannot conveniently obtain the information to practice 
it. To explain how this "information gap" precludes 
discrimination, we shall initially show that while 
markets may segment by quality level , individual firms 
will sell products at prices which accurately reflect 
their quality differences. Let consumers be divided 
into two clases, sophisticated (Class " A " )  and un-
sophisticated (Class "B") . A sophisticated consumer 
can discern a difference in quality between two seemingly 
identical products . Two versions of the product are 
sold in the market, high quality ( "X " )  and low quality 
(" Y"), but both versions would appear identical to the 
ignorant eye. Firms purchase these versions at prices 
which reflect their quality attributes. If firms could 
distinguish Class A consumers (sophisticated) from Class B 
consumers (unsophisticated), they would sell x goods (high 
quality) to the former and Y goods (low quality) to the 
latter, for the same price. This would maximize profits 
because Y goods cost firms less than X goods. 
Sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers, how-
ever, look very much alike, and in mass transactions 
the costs to firms of examining consumers to ascertain 
- l'i l'i -
into which class they fall would exceed the gains. In 
these circumstances, an apparently profitable strategy 
would be for firms to let consumers sort themselves 
out by their purchases. Each firm could put a mix of 
x and y goods on the shelf so that Class A consumers 
would buy the former and Class B consumers the latter. 
Such a strategy would fail if an appreciable number 
of sophisticated consumers existed because unsophisti-
cated consumers sometimes would luckily purchase X 
goods. The A consumers would only buy these goods, 
but B consumers would buy both X and Y goods because 
they cannot distinguish between them. Thus each firm 
would have to set out more X goods than it has A cus-
tomers ; otherwise its B customers would purchase some 
of the goods intended for the A customers, thereby 
causing these persons to switch to other firms. Setting 
out somewhat more X goods than there are A customers, 
however, would create an unstable situation because 
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the higher the ratio of X goods to Y goods the more 
often would B customers purchase X goods. Thus each 
firm would face a constant pressure to increase the 
ratio of X goods to Y goods. 
A numerical example illustrates how this pressure 
would work. Let a firm have 1 0 0  customers half of 
which are A's (sophisticated) and half B ' s  (unsophis-
ticated). The firm initially stocks 1 0 0  widgets, 5 � 
of which are X and 5 0  Y. The demand for good widgets 
(Dx) 5 0  (by A's) + 2 5  (by B ' s). All A ' s  of course 
demand X widgets. But B ' s  demand 2 5  X widgets because 
if a B consumer cannot distinguish X ' s  from Y's and 
5 0 %  X ' s  and 5 0 %  Y's are present, the B consumer wil l  
choose a n  X widget 5 0 %  o f  the time. Thus in this example 
the firm sets out 50 X widgets but has a demand for 7 5  
X widgets. Let the firm next set out 75 X widgets and 
2 5  Y widgets. ox 50 (by A's) + 3 6 . 5  (by B's). Once 
again, if there are 7 5 %  good widgets, unsophisticated 
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consumers will choose a good widget 7 5 %  o f  the time. 
Thus although there now are 25 more X widgets than A 
customers, the demand for X widgets has risen from 75 
to 8 6 . 5 .  Again, the firm is understocked . The outcome 
of this is that firms would specialize by quality level, 
some firms, as in this illustration, selling only X 
goods, others only Y goods, at different prices , The 
class into which a particular firm would fall would be 
determined by the percentage of knowledgeable customers 
it has, the market price and the cost difference to the 
firm of purchasing good and bad versions of the product. 
Decisionmakers in consequence could examine the 
effect of imperfect information on the prices of X and Y 
goods in the fashion we have previously described. Thus 
the possibility of discrimination in quality levels does 
not add very much additional complexity to the (already 
complicated) analysis of mass transaction markets character-
ized by imperfect information. 
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This model also shows that individual firms 
generally would not discriminate among customers by 
price or terms. Let Class A consumers be comparison 
shoppers and Class B consumers only visit one firm. 
Because firms cannot distinguish in this respect 
among consumers they wil l offer each consumer the same 
contract package. In transactions commonly recognized 
as "mass", moreover, each firm commonly does sel l  goods 
or services at the same price and under the same terms 
51/ 
to all its customers:- Whether this is a competitive 
package or one above it depends, we have seen, on the 
ratio of comparison shoppers to total shoppers in the 
market. 
2 .  Individualized Transactions 
In individualized transactions, where firm repre-
sentatives spend a relatively large amount of time with 
customers and in consequence can get to know them, firms 
apparently can discriminate in price and quality without 
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incurring excessive costs. Ascertaining the existence 
of such discrimination, however, would be very difficult, 
largely because of the prohibitive cost of establishing 
actual transaction prices or quality differences among 
goods sold at similar prices. Thus the question for 
decisionmakers apparently is whether particular circum-
stances make discrimination likely. Once more, the 
probability of discrimination appears largely to be a 
function of the ratio of knowledgeable consumers to total 
consumers in a given market. The more consumers who 
are knowledgeab le about the price and quality differences 
among new cars, for example, the lower the inducement to 
a dealer to invest resources in ascertaining and acting 
upon differences in consumer awareness leve ls, even though 
here the circumstances more easily permit such activities. 
In markets in which discrimination is possible --
cars , expensive stereo equipment -- some consumers, per-
haps because they are aware of the difficulty of ascer-
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taining quality , are willing to purchase information 
which classifies products by performance and price. 
In consequence, periodicals devoted exclusively or 
partially to rating cars and steros are quite common. 
The large amount of available information in these mar -
kets , in comparison to many other markets suggests that 
the ratio of knowledgeable consumers to total consumers 
' 
of cars and stereos may be high enough so that discrirn-
ination is not a serious problem. The very sparse and 
inconclusive empirical evidence is also consistent with 
this perception. 521 
�evertheless, discrimination is a potentially 
serious concern. Search equilibrium models shed 
relatively little light on the question when discrim-
ination is being practiced and what remedies are appro-
priate. Further , the remedy question raises issues 
which are beyond our scope. As an illustration, a way 
to prevent price discrimination in particular markets 
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is to require firms to charge all consumers the same 
price. Whether the welfare gains such a policy would 
confer on unsophisticated consumers would exceed the 
welfare losses to sophisticated consumers and firms as 
well as the costs of enforcing the policy is an issue 
we make no attempt here to resolve. Thus the analysis 
of this paper should be taken not to apply to individ-
ualized transactions, except insofar as it suggests 
that discrimination in such transactions does not now 
seem to be a serious problem. 
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v .  Normative I s sues and Pol icy Implications 
A .  Normative Issues 
Once it has been found that a market is behaving 
noncompetitively because too few consumers are informed , 
the initial choice a decisionmaker faces is whether to 
regulate the substantive transaction or to attempt to 
move the market toward a competitive equilibrium . We 
shall assume that regulation would involve ordering firms 
53/ to reduce monopoly prices�or exc ise from their contracts 
monopoly terms . Moving a market toward ( or to ) a com-
petitive equil ibrium is preferrable to such regulation , 
other things equal , for three reasons . First , regulation 
is unl ikely to be effective because firms can exploit in 
numerous ways the bargaining power which the lack of 
comparison shoppers confers on them. As an example , 
if a court banned the use of a particul ar term , firms 
could preserve their monopoly power by switching to other 
terms which also shift costs to consumers . This strategy 
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would probably be effective because if too few consumers 
comparison shopped to generate a nonmonopol istic equili-
brium respecting the term which firms initially used , 
it is unl ikely that enough consumers would comparison 
shop to ensure a nonmonopolistic equilibrium for the 
terms which firms substituted for the prohib ited one . 
A second ground for eschewing regulation is that 
it would not be optimal if consumers could conveniently 
be informed . Consumers who knowingly prefer higher 
prices to "harsh " terms would pay these prices whether
harsh terms were permitted or not , while a ban of terms 
would require consumers who prefer lower prices to pay 
higher ones and a limit on prices would require con-
sumers who knowingly prefer to pay higher prices to take 
instead harsh terms . 54/ 
Finally , seeming monopoly equilibria sometimes 
are unstable . For example , the standard automobile 
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warranty in use in the late 19 50 ' s  always appeared 
in arcane legal language and fine print , and apparently 
neither firms nor other institutions othe rwise in formed 
consumers of the nature of the risks they were bearing . 
Yet the industry began to compete extensive ly on war-
ranty coverage in the 1 9 6 0 ' s ,  and continues to compete 
55/ 
in this area today . Were the state to have required 
automobi le warranties to contain certain terms but not 
others , it might have prevented the emergence of this 
. . b h . 
56/ 
competitive e avior . -
For these reasons , the preferable state response 
when imperfect information has caused a market to behave 
noncompetitively is to move the market toward a competi-
tive equilibrium. Promis ing methods of achieving this 
goa l ,  we shall next see , would reduce the costs to con-
sumers of comparison shopping . Before discussing the se 
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methods ,  however , i t  will b e  useful to reevaluate a 
cruc ial premise of the argument so far , that an inter-
vention which would reduce the costs to consumers of 
becoming informed -- termed here " required disclosure " 
is not j ustified if the market at issue is competi-
tive . Such an intervention , we assume , is unnecessary 
because a property of competitive markets is to generate 
prices and terms that are util ity maximiz ing for all 
consumers .  An efficiency argument and two fairness 
arguments nevertheless might be made to j ustify required 
disclosure in competitive markets .  
The efficiency argument begins with the plaus-
ible assumption that although a market i s  competitive , 
the state nevertheless could reduce the costs of compari-
son shopping ( for example , by requir ing firms to quote 
prices in standard fashion ) . Such an intervention would 
raise each f irm ' s  average cost curve and in con sequence 
would require all consumers to pay higher prices . But 
- 7 7 -
if the net gains the intervention could generate for 
the comparison shoppers (reduced search costs minus 
higher prices )  would exceed the losses to nonshoppers 
(who would have no gains because they do not shop but 
who nevertheless would pay the higher prices )  and the 
costs of administering the law , the intervention would 
be optima l . 
It would be almost impossible , however , for an 
actual deci sionmaker to make this " utility calculus " ,
largely because the relevant facts would be too expen-
sive to collec t .  Further , n o  theoretical reason exists 
to bel ieve that requireddisclosure in competitive markets 
would usually produce greater wel fare gains than losses . 
And if one were to speculate about the fact s ,  such an 
outcome seems unl ikely given the expense of administering 
disclosure legislation . Therefore , it seems wiser to 
l imit efficiency motivated interventions to the case of 
noncompetitive markets .  
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A fairness argument that required disclosure should 
be imposed in competitive markets stems from the premise 
that persons " should be " relieved from the chore of 
shopping ; thus an intervention which reduces search 
costs is des irable in virtue of this effect alone . How-
ever , while such an intervention would increase the 
leisure time of shoppers ,  it would also impose costs 
on nonshoppers and the state . Thus this j ustification 
for required disclosure is unpursuas ive unless a further 
argument exists to justify making shoppers wealthier 
at the expense of other consumers .  The only argument 
which seems germane is that the comparison shoppers 
generated the competitive equilibrium , which benefitted 
all consumers , and thus deserve compensation . But this 
case for compensation dissolves under ana lysis . One 
j ustification for making a set of persons -- here shoppers 
wealthier is to encourage them to take socially desirable 
57/ 1 d actions .�The comparison shoppers , however , are a rea Y 
doing what they are " supposed to " be doing -- helping 
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maintain a competitive market--so it is unnecessary 
to pay them. A second possible ground for increasing 
the wealth of comparison shoppers is that they are 
worthier than nonshoppers .  But it is difficult to perceive 
the basis for this c laim . Such persons shop because 
the private gains to them from shopping exceed the costs . 
No prevalent ethica l  s cheme j ustifies making them better 
off at the expense of other person s  because they act 
from thi s  motive . And no other indicia of greater 
worthiness appear germane . Thus this fairness argument , 
that shopping is a burden which the state should always 
a':!tempt to lighten , must be rej ected . 
A perhaps more pursuasive argument is that disclosure 
legislation increases the opportunity for consumers to 
participate in market transactions , and in consequence 
makes those transactions seem fair . Some consumers ,  this 
argument runs , may realize that they are agreeing to contracts 
under conditions of imperfect information because they find 
- s o -
the costs o f  becoming informed to b e  prohibitive . I f  these 
consumers later become dissatisfied with their deals , they 
may find unpursuasive the response that a competitive market 
protected them against overreaching by firms ; the choices 
of those of their fellow citiz ens who comparison shopped , they 
will say , are not as good a guarantor of fair terms as their 
own informed choices would have been , yet the circumstances 
under which such choices could have been rnade--i . e .  the 
existence of low search costs--were absent.. Thi s  c laim of 
un fairness would be much less tenab l e ,  however ,  if the state 
had taken obvious steps to insure that the relevant information 
was readily available . In those c ircumstances ,  every consumer 
would ( or should) realize that society had serious ly attempt-
ed to increase the opportunity of consumers to affect their 
own transactions . Because it is important that persons 
have faith in the fairness of social institution s , the 
state should therefore make obvious efforts to increase 
market parti cipation by reducing search costs in all 
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markets ,  not just noncompetitive ones . SB/ 
Although this fairnes s  argument has some merit , 
it seems a weak support for required disclosure in 
competitive markets .  Initially , the c laim is not ob-
viously more compel l ing than a corrolary fairness claim 
of the comparison shoppers .  If a market is competitive , 
a substantial number of consumers must have found it 
convenient to inform themselves . Such consumers might 
find it unfair to be compelled to pay higher prices be-
cause other consumers could ( or would ) later repent 
of their choices to consume leisure or engage in work 
rather than search . No reason appears to subordinate· 
this fairness claim of comparison shoppers to the fair-
ness claim of the nonsearchers . And if the fairness 
issue is indeterminate , the administrative costs of 
required disc losure count strongly against intervention . 
Also , the nonsearchers ' fairness c laim may often be 
diss ipated by debate ; the consumers who make it , that 
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is , may b e  pursuaded to change their views when they 
become aware of the ratio of costs to gains which 
interventions in competitive markets commonly generate , 
Finally , this fairnes s  argument only j u stifies inter-
ventions when consumer dissatisfaction i s  widespread 
and apparent ; for given the costs of intervening , it 
seems erroneous merely to presume that many consumers 
believe the market game to be unfair . For all of these 
reason s , our premise that required disclo sure should 
only be imposed in noncompetitive markets , as best as 
these can be determined , seems general ly valid , 
B .  
1 .  
Policy Recommendations 
Removing Legal Restraints 
Before discussing affirmative steps to improve the 
competitive behavior of markets ,  we should describe a 
set of solutions which responds both to the difficulty of 
establishing noncompetitive behavior and the pos sibil ity 
- 8 3 -
of ;i:ts occurrence -.,.. the removal of legal barriers 
which may prevent the attainment of competitive equi-
l ibria , Three methods of pursuing a strategy of letting 
markets work seem promising , First ; restrictions on 
59/ 
nonfraudulent advertising should be removed-:- The models 
which Part I! described show that advertising i s  useful 
in preventing the. exi stence of monopol istic equilibria 
and in moving markets toward competitive equilibria , 
Thi s result i s  cons istent with, and help s . explain , 
evidence that prices are higher when advertising is pro� 
60/ 
hibited than when it is allowed .� Thus prohibitions or 
restrictions on the advertising of the prices and contract 
terms of particular goods or service s ,  or restrictions 
on advertising in particular media , can reduce consumer 
welfare , in the sense of causing consumers to pay higher 
prices . 
Courts also should not regard the use by a seller of 
a standard form contract as a factor which mil itates 
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against enforcement of this contract if its method of 
quoting the terms at issue is similar to the methods 
commonly used for quoting terms of thi s kind , The 
fixed sample size· model showed that a market is more 
l ikely to behave competitively i f  many consumers com-
parison shopped and if comparison shoppers visited a 
relatively large num er of stores . We have also seen 
that if firms standardize the way in which prices and 
terms are quoted , the cost of comparison shopping is 
lessened . I f  a firm ' s  chances of enforcing its con-
. tracts are reduced because those contracts are standard-
ized , however ,  the costs of private , voluntary standard-
ization will rise . And less of it could take place . 
Therefore , that a particular contract is cast in stand-
ard form should no longer militate against enforcing it , 61/
Finally , the government should consider relaxing 
the antitrust laws to permit more voluntary standardi-
zation of the fashion in which contract prices and terms 
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are quoted. It is ccmoonly said that the threat of anti-trust 
62 / 
prosecution inhibits such private standardization .� Because 
standardization increases the likelihood of markets behaving 
competitively, the threat apparently should be eliminated . This 
is not to say that the govennrent should view benignly agreements 
by firms always to use the same terms , but only to suggest the 
social desirability of agreements that if a particular term is 
used, it is always to be set out in standard fashion� Even so , 
relaxing the antitrust laws is a proposal which deseryes nuch more 
consideration than we give it here. - The obj ection to it is that 
firms may fix prices under the guise of standardizing contracts ,  or 
find it easier to police violators of cartel rules . But as standard-
ization itself conduces to competitive outcomes ,  reducing the costs 
of standardization in this fashion should be seriously explored. 
2 .  Affinnative Responses When Markets Are 
Found to Behave Noncompetitively 
In this section , we discuss pranising methods of rooving markets 
which have been found to be behaving noncompetitively toward competitive 
-86-
equilibria. Tne analysis is suggestive rather than directive , however , 
because the wisdan of a particular legal initiative turns on a comparison 
of its costs and gains , and these carm.ot be assessed without an explora-
tion of the specific contexts in which the initiative will operate . 
As an �le, a decisionmaker should attanpt to compare the welfare 
gains an intervention may produce by rooving a market closer to the 
competitive outcome with the costs to the state of administering and 
to the parties of complying with the new legal requirement .  Also , in-
terventions may produce undesirable "second order effects" , such as 
charmelling competition in a particular market along those quality 
or term dimensions firms may be required to disclose .  63 1  Canparing 
possible welfare gains and administrative costs and analyzing the 
likelihood of second order effects are beyond our scope . We therefore 
are interested here primarily in raising issues for serious exploration. 
The IIDSt pranising method of making markets behave competitively 
is to provide consumers with comparative price and term information . 
If consumers ,  for �le, could cheaply obtain a list of all prices 
in a market (or just the lower ones) together with the identity of 
-87-
the fi.nns charging the prices , the likelihood of ca:apetitive equilibria 
obtaining �d be much enhanced. The experimental evidence also 
suggests that making canparative price data conveniently available 
64 I reduces consuner purchase costs . - Private fi.nns ,  however , seldan 
sell such information, apparently because they could not fully appro-
priate the value of the information produced. Once a finn created 
a price list , it �d have great difficulty preventing other fi.nns 
and consuners f,ran using the information it revealed without paying 
for it , A consumer who bought such a list, for exarrple , might freely . 
distribute it to his friends . Tlrus private fi.nns und�st in · 
the production of such information. 65 I Government agencies , however , 
could themselves produce and distribute comparative price data or 
subsidize fi.nns to do so , and recent suggestions have been made that 
theyshould engage in these activities . 661 
Three objections to a comparative price information program are 
likely to be made. First , it could actually raise prices ; second, 
consumers �d not absorb the information; and third, the information 
vntl.d be too expensive to provide . Respecting the first objection, if 
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fi.nns were prevented fran charging prices above the prices they 
supplied to the listing agency, they might quote higher prices than
they vntl.d otherwise charge . This may be because fi.nns anticipate 
cost increases or because they merely want to preserve flexibility. _ 
Both of these trotivations could be partly assuaged by publishing 
price lists frequently -- i . e .  once a week -- but the trore frequent 
the list, the roore costly is the program to administer . This ob-
j ection, however , illustrates anew the wisdan of attempting to 
confine interventions to the case of noncompetitive markets . In 
such cases , prices are already too high; and price lists are likely 
to generate lower (although perhaps not competitive) prices than
'iiotild obtain if nothing were done. 
The objection that consuners �d not absorb the data such lists 
�d contain stans fran the concept , in apparent ·vogue , of ' 'information 
overload. " This concept asserts that when consuners are provided with 
too much information they make dysfunctional decisions ; the circuits 
become overloaded, as it were . 67/ Evidence fran laboratory experiments , 
however , fails to support the existence of this phenanenon. That evidence 
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shows that more informati on enables consumers to make better 
purchase decisions than they would make were they wiinformed , 
with a "better" purchase decision defined as one which 
yields an outcome that more c losely approximates a consumer ' s
68 / 
actual preferences . � This is not to say that the informa-
tion overload phenomenon could never occur , but instead 
that it has not been veri fied wider experimental conditions 
in which a g.ood deal of information has been provided . 
Further , no one can now predict when consumers wil l  "overload " 
in real world situation s . Thus that information overload 
may occur if " too much" information is provided is an 
observation of little relevance to decisionmakers . Con-
sumers could decide that the potential gains from absorbing 
new information would exceed the costs . But given the 
potential savings that the provision of comparative price 
and term information could yield , assertions that such 
information would not be used seem premature .  
The administrative costs of a comparative price informa-
tion program, however , could exceed the welfare gains . It 
would be expensive to create and maintain price gathering 
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and promulgating agencies , t o  identi fy the firms and 
products which should be included on each list Los Angeles 
consumers may care little about Anaheim prices and to 
police firms to ensure that transaction prices are not sig-
ni ficantly higher than the prices firms provide to the 
lis ting agency . Nevertheles s , because providing consumers 
with inexpensive comparative price data would be so useful 
in moving markets toward competitive equilibri a ,  it is a 
�
reform which should be seriously explored . 
For the reasons given above , the state should also con-
sider requiring firms to standardiz e  methods of quoting prices 
and widely used terms . In fact , standardi zation is one 
of the solutions which modern disclosure law sometimes 
70/ 
adopts . � I f  prices and terms are required to be dis closed 
in standard form , however , the total amount of information 
firms put out could be reduced . The required s tandard form 
is likely to be concise , yet regulators may frown on the 
provision of additional information on the ground that 
it reduces the effect of or confuses the required disclosure . 
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Further , a standardiz ation requirement is likely to 
engender much litigation , particularly in the period 
shortly after it is imposed . It seems always to take 
some time -- in the case of Truth in Lending a long time - -
until courts and the enforcement agency are in even rpugh 
71 /
agreement as to the standardiz ation requirements . � 
These difficulties are set out not to discredit the 
standardiz ation method but to emphasize again the j ustifi-
cation for attempting to intervene only in noncompetitive 
markets . 
3 .  Institutional Implications 
Our analysi s  suggests that courts should p lay a more 
limited role in responding to information problems than 
they now do , and it confirms the wisdom of the recent 
trend to place greater reliance on administrative enforce-
ment . The uncons cionabi lity doctrine authorizes a court 
not to enforce a price or contract term if the price or 
term is both substantively and nonsubstantively uncon-
72/
s cionable . � The l atter requirement can currently be 
-92
-
satis fied by evidence that a consumer lacked the information 
73 ; 
to make utility maximiz ing purchase choices . � We have shown , 
however , that the appropriate issue i s  not whether a 
particular person was informed but whether the market in 
which he acted was behaving competitively , and that prices 
and terms should be considered substantively unfair in 
virtue so lely of the existence of noncompetitive behavior . 
Thus courts seemingly should inquire into the competitive 
state of markets when they are requested not to enforce 
contracts on information grounds . An unconscionabi lity 
doctrine which made the information issue germane in this
way , however , would be unsatisfactory for two reasons : it 
is very expensive to establish the existence of noncompetitive 
behavior , and courts cannot issue the remedies requisite to 
moving markets toward competitive equilibri a .  
Respecting expense , the criteria developed i n  Parts I I I  
and I V  require for their application a great deal of 
evidence , of which the most important would go to the degree 
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of price or term dispers ion , the extent of comparison 
shopping and the identification of re levant markets .
Contracts cases , especially those to which consumers 
are parties , se ldom involve stakes which would exceed 
the costs of compiling such evidence . It may be re-
sponded that parties to antitrust suits litigate issues 
of simi lar difficulty . But antitrust damages are 
generally much higher than contract damages ; antitrust 
damages are treb led ; and 'the winning party to an 
74  I
antitrust suit may get attorney ' s  fees . � Even s o ,  
the maj ority of private antitrust actions are brought 
after government initiated cases had established the 
75 I 
existence of noncompetitive behavior . � Thus trebl ing 
damages or awarding attorney ' s  fees are unlikely to pro-
vide consumers with the incentive to establish the 
effect of imperfect information on a market ' s  competitive 
stat e ,  And i f  this i s  s o ,  a court would simply l ack the 
76 I 
evidence to answer the relevant normative question . � 
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Courts ,  moreover , would remain poor institutions to 
resolve information problems if they could get the evidence 
the unconscionabi,li ty doctrine should require because 
courts can provide only " second best " remedies . The 
j udicial power is limited to striking an offending term 
or price . Yet we have alre ady shown that the preferred 
state response to the prob lem of imperfect information i s  
not regulation of this kind but the moving o f  markets 
toward competitive equi libria . The most promising means 
for doing this include providing consumers with compara-
- tive price and term data and requiring prices and terms 
to be quoted in standard fashion . Courts cannot use these 
methods .
For al l of these reasons , i f  the state were to assign 
responsibility for dealing with information problems to an 
administrative agency , as we next suggest , courts should 
no longer respond to them . In practi cal effec t ,  this 
would mean that a claim that the existence of imperfect 
-95-
information in some sense viti ated a party ' s  consent 
would not constitute a defense to a suit to enforce a 
contract . But legal reforms sufficiently e ffective to 
make plausible the ousting of courts may not be adopted 
for some time , and this possibility requires us to in-
quire into what role is now appropriate for courts to 
play in responding to information problems . 
The answer may be derived from the criteria developed 
above to guide the decision to intervene . Of thos.e 
criteria , the one most susceptible to intel ligent j udicial 
use , in the absence of much evidence respecting market 
conditions , is the fourth , which holds that the like lihood 
of competitive behavior occuring varies inversely with 
the ease of making comparisons among the prices and terms 
of different firms . A court could decide intelligently 
whether a challenged firm ' s  price or term was so obs curely 
quoted as to render quite difficult comparisons between it 
and other prices or terms . Also , an inexpensive market 
-9 6-
sample sometimes could support at least a rough j udgment 
as to whether such obscurity were common . Judicial 
application of thi s  fourth criterion -- i . e .  j udicial 
refusal to enforce a price or term solely on the ground 
that its obscurity raised the costs of comparison shopping 
would also have two advantages ; it may generate clearer 
77/ 
c lauses ;-and it would not be especially intrusive because 
firms could redraft offending cl.auses without altering 
the substance of their transactions ( except in so far as 
greater consumer awareness forced such alterations ) . 
Therefore , a court would . apparently be j ustified in
refusing to enforce those clauses ,which are obscurely 
drafted when the evidence also indicates that such obscure 
drafting is widespread . 
Even this limited j udicial role should be exercised 
cautiously . The comparison shopping criterion i s  only 
one of several , and a conclusion that a market is behaving 
noncompetitively thus cannot rest with much assurance 
solely on the premise that comparison shopping seems 
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difficult . That markets may be well behaved in the face 
of sub s tantial imperfect information' adds to the force of 
this caution . Further ,  it sometimes may be wrong to rest 
a conclusion that comparison shopping is relevantly 
difficult only on the ground that contracts are hard to 
read. This is because some evidence suggests that con-
sumers can be knowledgeable about market conditions 
even though they have difficulty reading contracts . As 
an example , consumers apparently knew that finance companies 
charged higher rates than banks despite the difficulty , 
before the Truth In Lending Law , of calculating the 
78 I 
AP R . �  Thus courts should only strike contract c lauses 
on the ground of imper£ect information when those clauses 
are egregiously obs cure and when such obs cure dra£ting 
commonly prevai ls . 
This analysis also suggests the apparent superiority 
of an administrative agency in responding to information 
problems . Such an agency would have three advantages 
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over courts . First , it could be given the resources 
adequately to investigate market condition s ;  second , it 
could be given the power to issue the remedies which are 
likely to be effective in making markets behave more 
competitively ; third , it would be more effective in 
polic ing disclosure schemes .  Consistent with this view , 
primary enforcement responsibility for the two maj or 
disc losure initiatives of recent years , the Truth I n  
Lending Law and The Magnuson-Moss Act ,  has been delegated 
79/ 
to administrative agencies . 
Our suggestion respecting agencies is made in 
awareness of the dismal record which administrative 
agencies have so far made in economic regulation . Indeed , 
given this record and the great complexity of information 
is sues , an honest and thorough attempt to devise an 
adequate administrative scheme could wel l end with the 
conclusion that such a scheme is impossib le . But at this 
stage in the understanding of information problems ( and 
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of agencies ) ,  the administrative solution seems sufficiently 
promis ing to be tried . 
Conclusion 
The existence of imperfect information is commonly 
thought to j ustify legal intervention because an imperfectly 
informed buyer cannot make utility maximiz ing purchase 
choices . This focus on the conditions under which indi-
viduals can make optimal decisions is unwise . Not only 
does it fail to give guidance to decisionmakers respecting 
when and how they should intervene in markets , but it is 
also misplaced; for when markets are competitive , individuals 
are protected from the adverse consequences of making 
decisions in the face of imperfect information . Therefore , 
decis ionmakers s hould attempt to ascertain whether non-
competitive behavior is occuring before intervening . Such 
a determination would be complex , expensive and inexact , but 
criteria exist which should enabl e  it to be made with an 
acceptabl e  (although not fully satisfactory) degree of rigor . 
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Further ,  once it has been decided that a market i s  
behaving noncompetitive ly ,  the preferable state response 
is not to regulate prices or contract terms but to increase 
competition in that market. Because courts can do little 
to increase competition , state responses to the existence 
of imperfect information should be primarily legis lative 
and administrative . 
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1 .  Recent statutes which attempt to eliminate the 
causes or respond to the effects of imperfect information 
include the Magnuson-Mos s Warranty-Federal Trade Commission 
Act , 15 U . S . C . A .  § §  2 3 01-12  ( 19 75 ) ; the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act ( "Truth in Lending " ) ; 15 U . S . C . A .  § §  1 6 0 1- 7 7  
( Supp . 1 9 7 1 ) ; The Consumer Product Safety Act , 15 U . S . C .A .  
§ §  2 0 5 1- 8 0  ( 19 7 2 ) ; The Consumer Leasing Act , 15 U . S . C . A .  
§ 1 6 6 7  ( 19 7 6 ) ; The Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act , 12 u . s . c . A .  § §  2 6 0 1- 1 7  (Supp . 19 7 8 ) ; and the Uni form 
Consumer Credit Code . The doctrine of strict liability 
in tort also is j ustified partly on the ground that 
consumers lack the information to evaluate the risks of 
product caused inj uries . See , �. ,  G .  CALABRES I ,  THE 
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 16 3-6 4 ( 19 70 ) ; Calabresi and Hirs choff , 
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort , 81 YALE L .  J .  
1055  ( 1 9 72 ) .
2 . A recent review article by two prominent commentators 
observed : "Among economic theorists , the decade of the 
1 9 7 0 s  has been the era of the e conomi cs of information . " 
P .  Joskow and R .  Noll , Regulation In Theory and Practice : 
An Overview , in PUBLIC REGULATION ( G .  Fromm ed . , forth-
coming 1 9 79 ) . Profe ssor Kornhauser recently made interesting 
reference to some of the ear li er work but did not attempt 
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to set out a general framework for responding to informa-
tion problems . See Kornhauser ,  Unconscionability in 
Standard Forms , 6 4  CALIF . L .  REV . 1151  ( 19 76 ) . 
3 . Many articles recite that the purpose of dis closure 
legislation is to enable consumers to make rational 
purchase decisions or not to waste money . A typical 
quote is 
The rationale behind FPLA [ Fair Product 
Labe ling Act ]  and other statutes which are 
designed to inform the consumer is clear . " I f  
the consumer i s  unable to choose on an informed 
basis , then his dollar is wasted . "
Macintyre , Fair Packaging And The Informed Consume r ,  4 1  
N . Y .  STATE BAR 6 8 7  ( 19 6 9 ) ; See also , �, Landers & 
Chandler , Truth In Lending Act and Vari ab le Rate Mortgages 
And Baloon Notes , 1 AMERICAN BAR FOUND . RES .  J. 3 5 , 6 4  
( 19 7 6 ) ; Thain , Credit Advertising And The Law : Truth In 
Lending And Rel ated Matters , 19 7 6  WASH . U . L . Q .  2 5 7 ,  2 5 8  
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( 1 9 7 6 ) ; Note , 1 9 7 3  WISC . L .  REV . 2 9 0 . It is also sometimes 
said that the purpose of providing information is to enable 
consumers better to compare purchase options . � Bissette 
v .  Colonial Mortgage Corporation , 3 4 0  F . Supp . 1 1 9 1  
( D . Col . 19 7 2 ) ; Ratner v .  Chemical Bank New York Trust 
Company , 3 2 9  F . Supp . 2 7 0  ( S . D . N .Y .  1 9 7 1 ) . The Declaration 
of Purpose in the Truth In Lending Law also explains that 
disclosure is required partly " s o  that the consumer wi ll 
be able to compare more readily the various credit terms 
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit . "
15 u . s . c .  § 1 6 0 1  ( 1 9 7 1  Supp . ) All of these rationales
apparently reduce to the c laim that uninformed consumers 
cannot contract in thei r  own best interests . It is also 
occas ionally said that providing consumers with more 
information wil l  increase competition , but the nexus 
between informing consumers and the existence and normative 
desirability of competitive markets is largely unexplained 
in the legal literature . See , �' REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
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COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE , CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE 
UNITED STATES (herein "CONSUMER CREDIT" ) . 17 1- 7 2  ( 1 9 7 2 ) . 
4 . A modi fied version of thi s i llustration was often 
used to explain the need for a Truth in Lending Law .
Firms were said to quote the price of money in such 
complex and confusing ways that consumers , in effect , 
could not know .whether the price was $ 4  or $ 2  and in 
consequence would sometimes "pay "  the $ 4  price . See , 
e . g . , Jordan and . Warren , Disclosure of Finance Charges : 
A.. Rationale , 6 4  MICH . L . REV . 1 2 8 5 , 12 9 3-9 4 , ( 19 6 6 ) . 
5 .  The lack of two kinds of information , it should 
be noted , may prevent a consumer from making utility 
maximiz ing choices . The textual illustration at note 4 ,
supr a ,  o f  a consumer unaware o f  the degree o f  price 
dispers ion , is meant to i lluminate cases where consumers 
know of avai lab le options but lack the information ful ly 
to evaluate them . Thus consumers know that all goods 
have pri ces , but may be unaware of where to find low 
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prices or be unable , as in the loan area , to compute actual 
interest rates . A second category of " information gaps " 
concerns cases where a consumer is ignorant of some elements 
of the set of options from which he must choose .  As an 
i llustration , a consumer may not know that certain drugs 
produce dangerous s ide effects , and thus may make the wrong 
choice , as measured by his own self-interest , from a set 
of options which includes taking drug X (dangerous but 
quite efficaceous ) ,  drug Y ( harmless but less powerfu l )  or 
no drug (dangerous in another way) . The method of reducing 
the costs of becoming informed apparently would only pro-
tect consumers from information gaps of the former kind ; 
for a consumer is unlikely to alter his behavior -- make 
different choices -- when the state makes it cheaper for 
him to evaluate options of whose exis tence he is ignorant . 
I f ,  however , the method of reducing the costs of acquiring 
information is conceived broadly to include not only 
making it cheaper for the consumer to evaluate known 
- 6 -
options but also cheaper to learn of the full set of 
options he actually faces , the distinction between the two 
kinds of information gaps loses functional significance . 
Warning consumers of the dangers which particular drugs 
pose , in this latter view , is in fact an aspect of the 
method of protecting the consumer by reducing his costs 
of becoming informed . This paper nevertheless focuses 
mainly on cases where the consumer knows in at least a 
vague sense of the market options he faces -- that prices 
vary , warranties and security interests are "broad " or 
"narrow" and so forth . The textual i llustrations should 
be taken to ref er to market options whi ch are known in 
this sense .  Thi s focus i s  adopted because Ameri can law 
is primarily concerned with information gaps which al legedly 
are a result of the high costs of ful ly evaluating known 
options , and also because the question what should be done 
when consumers are unaware of some of the options they face 
- 7 -
raises theoretical problems which current economic 
analysis has not yet resolved . 
6 . An i llustration of such a limitation is found in the 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code , which authorizes consumers 
only to grant purchase money security interests . Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code § 3 . 3 0 1  ( 19 74 Text ) . 
7 .  �'�' Fuentes v .  Shevin , 4 0 7  U . S .  6 7  ( 19 7 2 ) ;
Sniadach v .  Family Finance Corp . , 3 9 5  U . S .  3 3 7  ( 19 6 9 ) . 
8 . This argument also holds when consumers are unaware 
of the options they face . Warning of the dangers drugs 
pose thus wi ll enable a consumer to make the utility 
maximi zing choice from the (now fully perceived) set of 
options he faces . 
9 .  As an example , some consumers had reasonably accurate 
information respecting the interest rates they paid before 
pass age of the Truth In Lending Law , and some consumers 
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had quite inaccurate information after passage . See , � ,  
Mande l l ,  Consumer Perception o f  Incurred Interest Rates : 
An Empirical Test of the Efficacy of the Truth- In-Lending 
Law , 2 6  J . FIN . 1 1 4 3  0. 9 7 1 ) . 
10 . The debate over the need for a Truth In Lending Law 
illustrates this shortcoming in convent ional analysis . In 
Professor Kripke ' s  view , the law would accomp lish little 
"because the middle class buyer has already learned where 
credit is cheapest" . Kripke , Gesture And Re ality In 
Consumer Credit Reform , 44 N .Y . U , L .  REV . 1 ,  51 ( 1 9 6 9 ) ; 
See also Kripke , Consumer Credit Regulation : A Creditor-
Oriented Viewpoint , 6 8  COLUM . L .  REV .  4 4 5 , 4 6 0- 6 6  ( 19 6 8 ) . 
But Professor Landers claimed that prior to the Truth In 
Lending Law " consumers ' knowledge of the cost of credit 
is woefully inadequate " ,  and the law itself " seems to 
have had a minimal impact • . • " Landers and Chandler ,
supra note 3 ,  at 6 5 . A debate in these terms must 
necessarily be inconclus ive . As another illustrati on , 
the Magnuson-Mos s  Act requires increased disc losure of 
warranty provis ions partly " to improve the adequacy of 
information avai lable to consumers . II 15 U . S . C .A .  
§ 2 3 0 2 ( a ) . Professor Whitford surveyed new car buyers
before this Act to ascertain whether they understood the 
manner in which their warranty coverage was l imited . The 
percentage of correct answers he obtained varied from 
3 4 %  (where the car must be serviced) to 6 4 %  (warranty 
length ) . Whitford � Law And The Consumer Tran saction : A 
Case Study Of The Automobi le Warranty , 1 9 6 8  WISC . L .  REV . 
: 10 0 6 , 1 0 5 4 -5 5 .  I f  these percentages are typical for 
other consumer warranty provis ions , were the disclosure 
provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act necessary? The 
conventional analysis of information problems cannot pro-
vide an answer . 
Further , be cause the relationship between informed 
consumers and market outcomes has never been fully explored 
in the legal literature , these quantification problems 
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plague the few conunentators who support disclosure legislation 
partly because it helps produce competitive markets .  Thus 
Senator Douglas , the leading legis lative proponent of Truth 
In Lending , argued that " on ly . • •  10 percent cost conscious " 
consumers can "police " the market .  Quoted in CONSUMER CREDIT 
176 . The National Commission On Consumer Finance , however , 
c laimed that "effective price competition " would result i f  
" somewhere between one-third and one-half of the prospects 
are aware [ of interest rate s ]  and if some portion shop 
for credit • • • " Id . Neither proponent of the Law
j usti fied the percentages of informed consumers they claimed 
would be necessary to achieve the Law ' s  goa l .  
1 1 .  The classic study o f  how consumers search for purchase 
infqrmation is Katona and Mueller , A Study of Purchase 
Decis ions in 1 CONSUMER BEHAVIOR : THE DYNAMICS OF CONSUMER 
REACTION 3 0  ( 19 5 4 )  . Recent studies which describe consumer
search behavior include Newman , Consumer External Search : 
Amount and Determinants in CONSUMER AND INDUSTRIAL SUYING 
- 11 -
BEHAVIOR 7 9  (A . Woodside , T .  Sheth and P .  Bennett eds . 
19 7 7 ) ; Claxton , Fry and Portis , A Taxonomy of Prepurchase 
Information Gathering Patterns , 1 J. CONS . RES . 35 ( 19 7 4 ) ; 
Newman and Staelin , Prepurchase Information Seeking For 
New Cars and Maj or Household Applian ces , 9 J. MKT . RES . 
2 4 9  ( 1 9 7 2 ) . 
1 2 . That consumers who search benefit consumers who do 
not search has previously . been noted . See Rothschild ,
Mode ls of Market Organizat ion with Imperfect Information : 
A Survey , 8 1  J. POL . ECON . 12 8 3  ( 1 9 7 3 ) . 
1 3 .  This argument presupposes that firms do not discriminate 
among consumers on the basis of relative knowledge or 
sophistication . In Part IV B ,  infra , we consider the 
implications of relaxing thi s  assumption . 
1 4 . A "harsh"  contract clause , such as a broad dis claime r ,  
shifts many risks t o  consumers while a " gentle " clause , 
such as a broad warranty , shifts risks to firms . Consumers 
, .., 
who choose harsh clauses ( in return for lower prices)  thus 
are les s  risk averse than those who choose gentle ones . 
I f  the consumers who shop for contract terms always choose 
harsh ( or gentle) c lauses � it may be poss ib le to infer 
that searchers are less ( or more ) risk averse than non-
searchers , and thus that competition among firms for the 
bus iness of searchers would 'yield contract clauses which 
were not utility maximiz ing for the nonsearche rs .  But as 
no evidence that searchers always choose particular kinds 
of terms exists , it seems s afe to assume that the degree 
of risk avers ion does not corre late strongly with the 
� 
extent of search . This aside , poor consumers may be 
somewhat more willing than middle class consumers to trade 
lower prices for bearing more purchase risks . See Schwartz , 
A Reexamination Of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability ,  6 3  
VA . L .  REV. 1 0 5 3 , 1 0 5 8 - 5 9  ( 1 9 7 7) . Poor consumers , however , 
often seem to purchase in distinct markets .  See Kunreuther , 
- 1 3 -
Why The Poor Pay More For Food : Theoretical and Empirical 
Evidence , 4 6  J. BUS . 3 6 8 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ; FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES 
PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS ( 1 9 6 8 ) . 
15 . !:._g_. J .  WHITE & R .  SUMMERS , HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1 1 8- 1 9 , 12 8 ( 19 7 2 ) . 
16 . The argument to this point assumes that an inter-
vention on information grounds cannot be j ustifi ed if a 
market is already competitive because competitive markets 
generate prices and terms which are utility maximi z ing for 
all consumers .  In Part V A ,  infra , we discuss possible 
efficiency and fairness obj ections to this premise . 
1 7 . A good introduction to equilibrium analysis is 
A. CHIANG , FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 
3 9 - 4 9  ( 1 9 74 ) . 
1 8 . For fuller explanation of the Nash equilibrium concept , 
see R. LUCE and H .  RAIFFA , GAMES AND DECISIONS ( 19 5 7 ) . 
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19 . The previous two paragraphs des cribe a " stat i c  
equilibrium mode l " . Such models do not explain how 
markets out of equi librium reach equilibrium ; they do 
not , that is , describe dynamic processes . Static 
equilibrium models instead characteri ze the kinds of 
equilibria a market can sustain . The formal models 
dis cussed below are all static equilibrium models . 
Whi le dynamic models would be quite useful for under-
standing market phenomena ,  dynamic modeling is not 
sufficiently advanced to generate useable policy instru-
ments , 
2 0 .  Many of the s e  models are reviewed in Rothschild , 
Mode ls of Market Organization with Imperfect Information 
81 J , POL . ECON . 1 2 8 3  ( 19 7 3 ) . For a more recent survey , 
see L .  Wi lde , Market Search Models : A Selective Survey , 
Californi a Institute of Technology , Social Science 
Working Paper # 1 3 3  ( 1 9 7 6 ) . 
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2 1 .  An additional assumption is that a large number of 
firms exist . The obj ect is to characterize equilibria in 
markets where , imperfect information aside , the usual 
competitive assumptions obtain . 
2 2 . Consumers of course would have individual limit 
prices . One could derive for each firm a demand function 
(telling the firm the highes t  price it could profitably 
charge ) from the distributi on of individual limit prices , 
but thi s is not done because the - models ' results are 
qualitatively unchanged under the s implifying assumption . 
Respecting the realism of the assumption that consumers 
have limit prices , a recent review article observed that 
one can s ay "with reasonable certainty " that " the consumer 
enters the market not with a s ingle price in min d ,  but 
with a range of acceptable price s " . Gardner ,  The Role o f  
Price I n  Consumer Choice i n  SELECTED ASPECTS O F  CONSUMER 
BEHAVIOR , 4 15 , 4 2 7  ( NSF/RA 7 7- 0 0 1 3 , 1 9 7 7 ) . Res earchers 
also have surveyed consumers and report finding maximum 
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acceptable prices . See authorities cited note 3 9 , infra . 
2 3 .  � K .  Arrow and M .  Roths�hild , Preliminary Notes
on Equilibrium Price Distributions with Limited Information , 
The Economics Series , Institute of Mathematical Studies in 
The Social Sciences , Working Paper # 3 4. ,  Stanford University 
( 19 7 3 ) ; Diamond � A Model of Price Adj us tment ,  3 J. ECON . 
THEORY 1 5 6  ( 19 7 1 ) ; McCal l ,  The Economics of Information 
and Optimal Stopping Rules ,  3 8  J .  BUS . 3 0 0  ( 19 65 ) . 
2 4 . That the monopoly price is the only equilibrium when 
all consumers f ace pos itive search costs , know the price 
distribution and shop sequential ly has been observed by 
several a11thors . See Butters , Market Allocation Through 
Search : Equilibrium Adjustment and Price Dispersion : 
Comment ,  15 J. ECON . THEORY 2 2 5  ( 19 7 7 ) ; Arrow and Rothschi ld , 
supra note 2 3 ;  Diamond , supra note 2 3 .  
2 5 . In a market of very few firms , price cutting cou ld be 
an optimal strategy for a firm to follow if all firms 
charged the monopoly price because the odds of consumers 
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finding a price cutting firm vary inversely with the 
number of firms ; in consequence , consumers would be more 
likely to search for price cutters when very few firms 
exist . In such a case , however , the costs to firms of 
colluding to rai se prices are reduced , for collusion 
costs also vary inversely with the number of firms . No 
models des cribe the outcomes reached by oligopoly markets 
affected by imperfect information , apparently because of 
the difficulty of characteri z ing the strategies f irms 
pursue when they have incentives both to cut and col-
- lusively raise prices . 
2 6 . Salop and Stiglitz recently created a search 
equilibrium model in which consumers face two se arch 
options , to pay a set price and obtain a list of every 
firm charging the lowest price in the market or to visit 
one firm at random and pay whatever price that firm 
charges . S alop and Stiglitz , Bargains and Ripoffs : 
A Model of Monopolistically- Competitive Price Dispersion , 
-18-
4 4  REV . OF ECON . STUD . 4 9 3  ( 1 9 7 7 ) . In their model ,  a 
competitive equilibrium could occur only i f  a substantial 
number of consumers face z ero search costs . Should al.l 
consumers face positive search costs , a firm could increase 
profits if it raised its price above the competitive price 
by an amount less than the cost to consumers of paying 
the set price to become perfectly informed . Thus the 
competitive price could not be an equilibrium .  
2 7 .  An exception is Butters , Equi librium Distribution of 
S ales and Advertising Prices , 4 4  REV. OF ECON . STUD . 4 6 5  
( 1 9 77 ) . Professor Butters assumed that firms advertise 
only by sending to all potential buyers s lips of paper 
on whi ch are written the product type -- " a  pen" -- and 
the price . Buyers can costless ly proces s  all such adver-
tisements they receive but they obtain no other product 
information . From these conditions he generated an 
equilibrium pri ce distribution in which one firm charged 
the competitive price , another the limit or monopoly 
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price and all other firms were in between , no two firms 
charging the same price . The restrictiveness of his 
assumptions together with the improbability of this outcome 
actually obtaining suggest that his interesting theoreti cal 
models would not provide useful guidance to pol i cymakers . 
2 8 .  This model is presented formally in Wilde and S chwartz , 
Equilibrium Comparison Shopping , 45 REV. OF ECON . STUD . --
( Forthcoming 1 9 79 ) . Readers interested in the mathematics 
underlying the hueristic explanation the text next provides 
should refer to this paper . 
2 9 . A consumer is cons idered not to know the price 
distribution if he has little specific knowledge of the 
prices the market offers � A consumer would be ignorant 
of the price distribution in this sense although he knew 
that a nineteen inch color television set would be 
unlikely to cost him less than $ 2 0 0  or more than $ 6 5 0 . 
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30 . See , �, Rothschild , Searching for the Lowest Price
When the Distribut ion of Prices i s  Unknown , 8 2  J. POL . 
ECON . 6 8 9 ( 1 9  7 4 ) • 
3 1 .  See Gastwirth , On Probabilistic Mode ls of Consumer 
Search For Information , 9 0  QUARTERLY J. ECON . 3 8  ( 19 7 6 ) . 
32 . See Fried and Peterson , Information Seeking : Optimal 
Versus Fixed Stopping ,  8 0  J. EXPER . PSYCH . 5 25 ( 1 9 6 9 ) ; 
Pitz , Information Seeking When Availab le Information Is 
Limited , 76 J. EXPER. PSYCH . 2 5  ( 1 9 6 8 ) . 
33 . See Day and Brandt , A Study of Cons:umer Credit 
Decisions : Implications For Present and Prospective 
Legis lation , in THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON COMMISSION 
FINANCE , 1 TECHNICAL STUDIES 9 5  ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; Bucklin , Testing 
Propens ities to Shop , 3 0  J. MKT . 2 2  ( 1 9 6 6 ) ; Ude ll , 
Prepurchase Behavior of Buyers of Small E lectrical 
Appliances , 3 0  J .  MKT . 50 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ; authorities cited note 
1 1 ,  supr a .  
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3 4 . See Newman , supra note 1 1 ;  Swan , Search Behavior 
Related to Expectations Concerning Brand Performance , 
5 6  J. APP . PSYCH . 3 3 2  ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; Bucklin , supra note 3 3 . 
3 5 . Claxton , Fry and Portis , supra note 1 1 ;  Newman and 
Staelin , supra note 11 ; Katona & Mueller , supra note 11 . 
Psychologists have created the concept of "perceived 
risk " ,  whi ch they define as the risk the consumer associ ates 
with the financial , social and physical consequences which 
may f low from purchase of the product .  The higher the 
degree of perceived risk , they assert , the greater the 
amount of search because search generates information , which 
can reduce the consumer ' s  ( subj e ctively) preceived risk . 
Thus the psychological model also predicts greater search 
at higher prices . See J. ENGEL , T .  KOLLAT and R .  BLACKWELL , 
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 3 7 8 - 7 9 , 5 8 6 - 8 7  ( 2d .  ed . 1 9 7 3 ) . 
36 . Readers might observe that if PL ' the limit price ,
/'\ • I ' 1were only 1 . 5  times greater than p ,  a firm s margina 
- 2 2 -
cost , this equation yields absurd results (where PL = 
1 . 5� , ) . Such results would not occur 
in practice . The model shows that a competitive equilibrium 
occurs when the ratio of comparison shoppers to all 
shoppers (X) 2 \ - �scv1..- i  > The part of the equation 
to the right of the :? sign wil l  be less than one
( thereby ensuring a positive percentage of comparison 
shoppers ) i f  s ( \' 1. - � )  7 F The model in fact assumes 
that s ( � 1.. - � ) ::?. � because in equil ibrium PL must
equal the highe st price in the market . Thus to say that 
is to assume that a firm which 
operates at " capacity " ( s  is the profit maximi zing 
capacity) can recover its fixed cos t , F ( including a 
return on investment ) ,  when it charges the highest price 
the market wi ll permit (PL) .  Were thi s  condition
unsatisfied , no firms would be in the market .  As firms 
will of course exist in any case in whi ch the law is 
" 
interested , the condition s ( PL - p) 2 � wi ll be satis fied ;
- 2 3 -
and the equation for X ,  when applied t o  real markets , 
wi ll yield a zero (no amount of comparison shoppers can 
gerierate a competitive equi librium in .this parti cular 
market) or a pos itive fraction ( 1/3 as in the textual 
example) . 
To show that in equilibrium PL would be the market ' s
highest price , let the highest �rice in a market be Pb 
where Pb < PL . The firm charging Pb would only make sales
to those consumers who sample one firm ; consumers who 
sample more than one firm wil l  not purchase from the firm 
charging Pb because it would be the highest price they 
s e e .  Thus the firm charging P b  would have an incentive 
to raise its price above Pb because it would lose no 
customers . But the firm could not charge more than PL ,
for above P no sales are made . Thus the market ' s  
L 
highest price (Pb )  must equal PL in equi librium .
3 7 . See authorities cited supra note s 1 1 . and 3 3 . 
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38 . Methodological problems a lso cause the studies cited 
above to understate the amount of consumer search actual ly 
occurring . These studies rest on surveys of consumers 
taken from days to more than a year after the consumers pur-
chased the items in question . Consumers are unlikely to 
recall in detai l  the nature and number of information 
sources consulted . Further , many indices of search measure 
the number of categories of information sources consumers 
use -- store visits , friends , ad s, artic le s  -- but do not 
count frequency of use within categories . Some active 
searchers may therefore go undetected . Finally , studies 
of consumer search behavior usually neglect information 
seeking within retail uni ts .  See Newman and Lockman , 
Measuring Prepurchase Information Seeking , 2 J .  CONS . RES . 
216  ( 1 9 7 5 ) . These authors surveyed consumers after they 
shopped ( for women ' s  shoe s )  and also observed their search 
behavior . They found that consumers in fact received more 
information than they reported receiving . Id . C. f .  Day , 
Assessing the Effects of Information Disclosure Requirements , 
4 0  J .  MKT . ( # 2 )  4 2  ( 1 9 7 6 )  ( criticizing methodology of 
studies of the effectiveness of disclosure legislation in 
part because these studies relied heavily on self-reporting 
of behavior ) .
3 9 . Despite these difficulties , marketing scholars for 
several years have been surveying consumers to ascertain 
the maximum and minimum prices consumers would pay before 
they begin shopping , and apparently believe surveys of 
this kind would be useful to firms . See , � Adam , Consumer 
Reactions To Price in PRICING STRATEGY 75 (B . Taylor and 
G .  Wi lls , eds . 196 9 ) ; Fouilhe , The Subj ective Evaluation of 
Price : Methodological· Aspects , I d .  at 8 9 ;  Gabor & Granger , 
The Attitude of the Consumer to Prices , id . , at 1 3 2 ; Monroe , 
Buyers ' Subj ective Perceptions of Price ,  10 J .  MKT . RES .
7 0  (19 7 3 )  ; Monroe , Measuring Price Thresholds by Psychophys ics 
and Latitudes of Acceptance , 8 J. MKT . RES . 4 6 0  ( 1 9 7 1 ) ; 
-25 - - 2 6 -
Stoetze l ,  Psychological/Sociological Aspects of Price in 
PRICING s.TRATEGY , supra , at p .  7 0 .
4 0 . See Schoeber and Shay , State and Regional Estimates Of 
The Price And Volume Of The Maj or Types Of Consumer Credit 
In Mid- 1 9 7 1  i n  THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE , 
3 TECHNICAL STUDIES 1 ,  1 0 0 -0 9 , 118 , 1 2 0  ( 1 9 72 ) . 
4 1 .  See 4 3  CONS . REPORTS 2 0 2  ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 
4 2 . Day and Brandt , A Study of Consumer Credit Decis ions : 
Implications For Present and Prospective Legislation , in 
THE NATIONAL COMMISS ION ON CONSUMER FINANCE , 1 TECHNICAL 
STUDIES 1 ,  4 1 ,  6 7  ( 19 72 ) . 
4 3 .  The allegations prompted the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act , 15 u . s . c .A .  § 1 6 9 1  (West .  Supp . 19 7 8 ) , which outlaws 
such discrimination • 
4 4 .  In adj udicating the legality of a merger between two 
firms in the same line of business when the acquiri.ng _ 
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firm was not i n  the acquired firm ' s  market , the Supreme 
Court stated : 
[T ] he Court has recogni zed that a market extension 
merger may be unlawful i f  the target market is 
substanti ally concentrated , i f  the acquiring firm 
has the characteristics , capabilities , and e conomic 
incentive to render it a perceived potential de ·novo 
entrant , and if the acquiring firm ' s  premerger 
presence on the fringe of the target market in fact 
tempered oligopolistic behavior on the part of 
existing parti cipants in that market . In other 
words , the Court has interpreted § 7  [ of the Clayton 
Act]  as encompassing what is commonly known as 
the "wings effect" -- the probability that the 
acquiring firm prompted premerger procompetitive 
effects within the target market by being perceived 
by the existing firms in that market as l ikely to 
enter de nova . 
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United States v .  Marine Bancorporation , Inc . , 4 18 U . S .  6 0 2 , 
62 4 - 2 5  ( 19 7 4 ) . See also United States v .  General Dynamics 
Corp . , 4 15 U . S .  4 8 6  ( 1 9 74 ) ; United States v. Falstaff 
Brewing Corp . ,  4 1 0  U . S . 5 2 6  ( 1 9 7 3 ) . These inquiries are 
at least as complex and expensive to conduct as those we 
propose , and they seem less sus ceptible of precis e  answers ; 
for our criteria focus on observable facts such as market 
prices and the extent of comparison shopping rather than 
on such intangible factors as whether a firm would have 
entered a market or whether the possibility of entry 
"tempered " noncompetitive behavior by existing firms . 
45 . Because legislatures cannot conveniently ascertain 
the competitive state of particular markets before pass ing 
statutes , an institutional implication of the argument that 
an intervention should not be made un less a market ' s  
competitive state is explored is that state responses to 
the problem of noncompetitive behavior resulting from 
imperfect information should primarily be administrative 
- 2 9 -
o r  j udicial .  The antitrust laws , which seek to ascertain
and remedy noncompeti tive behavior resulting from structural 
market imperfections or collus ive behavior , afford a 
convenient analogy . For reasons developed in Part V ( B ) , 
infra , we argue that the admini strative process i s  best 
suited to respond to information problems . 
4 6 . This taxonomy was initially used in Nelson , Information 
and Consumer Behavior , 7 8  J. POL . ECON . 3 11 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . A 
third category� usually applied to services , i s  " credence " .
A credence quality cannot be evaluated by direct observation 
or use .  As an i llustration , a consumer may never know 
whether the automobile repair he purchased was actually 
necessary . See Darby and Karni , Free Competition and the 
Optimal Amount of Fraud , 1 6  J. LAW & ECON . 6 7  ( 1 9 7 3 ) . 
No search equilibrium mode ls consider credence qualities .
4 7 .  Udell reports that 7 3 %  of the purchases o f  small 
appliances were planned prior to shopping in a store , which 
suggests that consumers comparison shop within quality 
- 3 0 -
levels . Ude l l ,  Prepurchase Behavior of Buyers of Small 
Electrical Appliances , 3 0  J .  MKT . 5 0 , 5 2  ( 19 6 6 ) . I f  a 
maj ority of consumers comparison shop across quality 
levels � market price distributions for some goods may be 
too ambiguous to evaluate . 
4 8 . The courts have split on the question whether the 
Truth In Lending Law requires disc losure of accelleration 
clauses . For a dis cuss ion of the cases s ee Comment , 
Accelleration Clause Di sclosure Under The Truth In Lending 
�' 77 COLOM . L . REV .  6 4 9  ( 19 7 7 )  ( Concludes that di sclosure
is not required under current law , but that the statute 
should be amended to require it because "a right of 
accel leration is of s ignificance to the borrower • • . 
Id . at 6 6 8 ) . See also Note , Accelleration Clause Dis-
II 
closure : A Truth in Lending Policy Analysis , 5 3 IND . L.  J .  
9 7  ( 19 77 ) . 
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4 9 . By contrast , a competitive equilibrium is one in which , 
given existing technology , costs , and consumer tastes , the 
market gener�tes a mix of terms that maximizes social welfare 
rather than the we lfare of firms . In such a cas e , it should 
be noted , firms will not necessarily provide the s ame terms 
to all consumers .  This largely is because consumers di ffer in 
their degree of risk aversion and time preference (!·�·  some 
consumers may prefer to consume Fiats , which are disposab le , 
and thus they will not seek long term warranties ) . 
5 0 . We have phrased the issue as whether a market i s  mono-
polistic respecting terms because administrative difficulties 
should (ftnd probably would) prevent decisionmakers from 
evaluating term equilibria intermediate between competition 
and monopoly . It would be extraordinarily difficult 
(perhaps impossible) to compute the welfare loss of such 
equi:libria , as contrasted with a competitive equilibrium 
respecting the purchase terms at issue . Also , present 
economic models are unable to characterize intermediate 
- 3 2 -
equi libria as regards terms . Thus when terms are at issue , 
a decisionmaker should intervene ( cost of intervention 
problems aside } only when a monopoly outcome occurs . For 
an attempt to characteri ze the welfare e ffects of imperfect 
information when pri ce is the only variable and the setting 
is otherwise somewhat artificial (the government controls 
all the price� } see Diamond , Wel fare Analys is of Imperfect 
Information Equilib·ria ,  9 BELL ;J., ECON . 8 2  ( 19 78 ) . 
5 1 .  Some corroboration o f  the mode l l ie s  in studies which 
indicate that individual retailers do not discriminate 
among consumers on the basis· of income or ethnic character-
istics r both of which are commonly used as proxies for 
being uninformed or unsophisticated . See J .  ENGEL , D .  KOLLAT 
and R .  BLACKWELL , supra , n .  3 5 , at p .  1 8 7 , 
5 2 . An empirical study which sent researchers dis guised 
as potential buyers to new car dealers found no statistically 
s ignificant differences between the prices quoted to black 
- 3 3 -
and white buyers but did find such di fferences between 
the prices quoted to "poorly dressed " and other buyers . 
These differences seemed small . A poorly dressed black 
received price quotes on new cars the mean of which was 
$ 3 , 8 3 6 . 18 while a well-dressed black received quotes the 
mean of which was $ 3 , 75 4 . 1 4 ,  a di fference of $ 8 2 . 0 4 ;  
Wi se , Differential Pricing and Treatme�t by New-Car 
Salesmen � The Effect of the Prospect ' s  Race , Sex and 
Dress , 4 7  J .  BUS . 2 1 8  ( 19 7 4 } . See also Wise , Cox and 
Floto , Sex and Race Discrimination in the New-Car Showroom : 
. A Fact or Myth?, 11 J .  CONS . AFFAIRS 1 0 7  ( # 2 }  ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
Dealers , it should be noted , do not discriminate among 
consumers . on the basis of contract terms , nor can they 
seriously discriminate on the basis of quality . C . f . 
Le ff , Contract As Thing , 1 9  AM . U . L .  REV. 1 3 1  ( 1 9 7 0 ) . 
( Observing that the sometimes extensive bargaining 
between consumers and automobile dealers did not concern 
the contract of sale ) . 
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S 3 . C . f .  Jones v. Star Credit Corp . , S9 Misc .  2d 1 8 9 , 2 9 8  
N . Y , S .  2 d  2 6 4  (N . Y . S . Ct .  1 9 6 9 )  ( refusing to enforce the 
full contract price on the ground that it was unconscionably 
high) ; American Horne Improvement , Inc .  v. Maciver , 109 
N . H .  4 3S ,  201 A .  2d 886 ( 1 9 6 8 )  (same ) ; Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code § S . 10 8  ( 4 )  ( c )  ( 19 7 4  Text ) (provides that a 
" factor " supporting a finding of unconscionability is 
" gross disparity between the price . • . and the value of
the property • • • me asured by the price at which simi lar
property • • • [ i s ]  re adi ly obtainable • • • by like
consumers " ) . 
S 4 , See S chwartz , supra note 1 4 , at 10S 7 - S 9 . 
SS . See S chwartz , Sel ler Unequal Bargaining Power And The
Judicial Process , 4 9  IND . L .  J .  3 6 7 ,  3 8 S  n .  4 1  ( 19 7 4 ) . 
S 6 . These three reasons would also mi litate against regula-
tion whi ch takes the form of requiring firms to substitute 
- 3 S -
gentle for harsh clauses . The Magnuson-Moss Act , however , 
does engage in regulation , as it provides that firms 
cannot disclaim implied warranties if they make written 
express warranties . lS u . s . c .A .  § 2 3 0 8  ( 1 9 7S ) . 
S 7 . See , Daniels , Merit and Meritocracy , 17 PHI L . & PUB . 
AFFAIRS 2 0 6  ( 1 9 7 8 ) . 
S 8 . This fairness claim seems analagous to the claim 
that a person has a right to a he aring to contest dis-
advantaging action even though the person lacks an 
entitlement to a particular outcome which the hearing 
could protect . In such a cas e ,  the right to a hearing 
arises because the persons who have taken the disadvantaging 
action and the affected party are members of the same 
community ; and as between members of a conununity one is 
entitled to have from others an explanation of their 
actions which affect him and a cnance- to participate in 
those actions . See Miche lman , Formal and Associational 
Aims In Procedural Due Proces s ,  in 18 NOMOS DUE PROCESS 
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12 6 (J , Pennock and J .  Chapman , eds . 1 9 7 7 ) . Simi larly , 
it may be c laimed that a person has a right to have 
search costs reduced in competitive markets , not because 
one has a right to a particular market outcome , but 
because all members of a community are entitled to 
participate in actions which affect them -- here the 
workings of the market -- and reducing search costs 
conduces to this end . In addition to tra difficulties 
with this position which the text next discusses , we 
add that it is a difficult position to confine . All 
persons have a formal right to participate in the market --
the nonsearchers could search and many actions could 
make that right more real , such as redistributing wealth 
to give some groups a greater say in market outcomes . 
The position that " extra formal " rights to participate 
should be created does not shed very much light on which 
such rights the state should enact into l aw .  In any event , 
we have no reason to assume that Professor Michelman 
would extend his analysis to the market context . 
- 3 7 -
5 9 . The Supreme Court has held that advertising of prices 
in some circumstances has First Amendment protection . 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v .  Virginia Citi zens 
Consumers Counci l , 4 2 5  U . S . 7 4 8  ( 1 9 76 ) ; Bigelow v. Virginia , 
4 2 1  U . S .  8 0 9  (1975 ) . 
6 0 .  See Benham , The Effect of 'Advertising on the Pri ce 
of Eyeglasses , 15 J .  LAW & ECON . 3 3 7  ( 1 9 72 ) . 
6 1 .  One author o f  this article has recently argued that 
if consumers are assumed to have sufficient information , 
the existence of a standard form contract should be
neutral with respect to the question whether a court 
should enforce any of the clauses in i t .  See Schwartz , 
supra note 1 4 ,  at 1 0 6 4 - 7 1 .  The argument made above shows 
that the existence of a standard form contract should be 
neutral with respect to the enforcement decision even 
though consumers are assumed to be imperfectly informed . 
- 3 8 -
6 2 , See L. FULLER and M. EISENBERG , BASIC CONTRACT LAW 
5 3 2  ( 1 9 72 ) . See also P .  KEETON and M. SHAPO , PRODUCTS AND 
THE CONSUMER: DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 3 5 5  ( 1 9 72 ) . 
6 3 . See Day , supra note 3 8 .  
6 4 . Res earchers studied the " e ffectiveness " of legal ly 
required unit pricing by posting next to the supermarket 
shelf on which particular brands appeared a list which 
identified each brand and gave its unit pri ce . Consumers 
could compare unit prices more conveniently with such a 
list than i f  they were required to make comparisons and 
computations directly from the labels of products on the 
shelf . These price lists were compiled for three relatively 
homogeneous products ( canned dogfood , facial tissue and 
dishwashing liquid ) and posted for three week s . Consumers 
paid from 1 . 4 % lower prices for dogfood to 2 . 9 % lower 
prices for dishwashing liquid because some of them 
switched to less expensive brands . Russo, Krieser and 
Miyashita , An Effective Display of Unit Price Information , 
3 9  J .  MKT . ( #2 )  11 ( 1 9 75 ) . This research and our analysis 
suggest that recent bills which would require pharmacists 
to post the prices of commonly used prescription drugs 
would be effective in reducing drug prices . See H . R .  10 6 8 1 ,  
9 5 th CONG , 2d .  SESS . ( 19 7 8 ) ; H . R .  4 5 9 1 , 9 5th CONG . 1st SESS . 
( 19 7 7 ) . Price lists which saved consumers the trouble of 
going from firm to firm rather than from one end of a 
shelf to the other thus might produce s ignificant reductions 
in purchase costs . Providing consumers with lists of 
commonly used terms -- firm X warrants , firm Y disc laims - -
- might also improve the efficiency of market outcomes .
6 5 . When firms can exclude " freeloaders " or capture a 
high portion of the returns which providing comparative 
price or term information yields , the market will produce 
such informati on . As an example , a subscription cable 
television company in Los Angeles televises comparative 
grocery prices because it can charge most of the recipients 
- 4 0 -
of this information . In addition , firms which charge 
relatively low prices have an incentive to publish adver-
tisements comparing their prices to those of their 
competitors � and such advertisements are sometimes seen . 
A dis incentive to advertise in this fashion i s  that it can 
provide free and useful publicity to firms whose prices 
are close to those of the advertising firm, for consumers 
could decide that there is insuffici ent price dispersion 
to warrant searching out the firm which charges the very 
lowest price . Firms which engage in comparative price 
advertising als o - have incentives to misrepresent the com-
parisons , as for example by suppressing quality differences . 
For a discus sion of the legal regulation of comparative adver-
tisement s , see Rollins , Comparative Price Advertising , 
3 3  BUS . LAWYER 1 7 7 1  (19 7 8 ) . 
6 6 . A proposed bill to simplify the Truth in Lending Law 
would authorize the Federal Reserve Board to 
collect , publish and disseminate to the public , 
on a demonstration basis in a number of standard 
- 4 1 -
metropolitan statistical areas t o  b e  determined 
by the Board , the annual percentage rates charged 
for representative types of nonsale credit by 
creditors in s uch areas . 
The Board was also authorized "to require creditors in 
such are as to furnish informat ion necessary for the 
Board • • • •  " S . 2 80 2 , 95th CONG . 2d .  SESS . § 1 3 6  ( a )  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
Although publishing such information i s  in general an 
excellent idea , some evidence suggests that many consumer 
credit markets may now be sufficiently compet itive as not 
- to j usti fy the expense this statute would entai l . See 
text at notes 4 0 - 4 2 , supra . Thus we would recommend that 
the Board should not use § 1 3 6  ( a )  ( assuming the bill 
passes ) without first ascertaining the state of competition 
in the markets at is sue . 
6 7 .  As an illustration of the popularity of this concept ,  
a Governor o f  the Federal Reserve Board recently explained 
- 4 2 -
to the Senate a Board proposal to s implify the Truth in 
Lending Law partly as follows : 
Looking at these [ commonly used credit] forms � 
it is hard to avoid the impression of information 
overload . There is more information than most con-
sumers can digest . By reducing the number of i tems 
of informat ion disclosed as under the Board ' s  pro-
pos a l , the impo,rtant ones will receive a greater 
emphasis and there will be a greater likelihood of 
affecting consumer behavior . 
Statement by Philip C .  Jackson , Jr . , Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System before the Consumer Affairs 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking , Finance and 
Urban Affairs , United States Senate 4 - 5  ( July 1 1 , 1 9 7 7 ) . 
See also Davis , Protecting Consumers From Overdisclosure 
and Gobbledygook : An Emp irical Look at the Simplification 
of Consumer-Credit Contracts ,  6 3  VA . L . REV . 8 41 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
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6 8 .  The only serious studies of information overload were 
by Professor Jacoby . See Jacoby , Spel ler and Kohn , Brand 
Choice Behavior As A Function of Information Overload , 11 
J ,MKT . 63  ( 19 7 4 ) ; Brand Choice Behavior As A Function of 
Information Load : Replication and Exten sion , 1 J .  CONS . 
RES . 3 3  ( 19 74 ) . Jacoby first interviewed consumers to 
ascertain their " ideal " brand . He then required consumers 
to choose from among a set of unknown brands on the basis 
of "bits " of information describing each brand . In
these experiments , both the number of unknown brands and 
- the bits of information per unknown brand were varied . 
Jacoby defined a "better" decision as one which se lected 
a brand close to the consumer ' s  ideal brand , and he 
reported that increasing the amount of information con-
s umers were provided caused worse in his words 
"dysfunctional " -- decisions . His methodology and 
conclusions were quite criti cally reviewed . The most 
serious criticism was that Jacoby failed to compare his 
- 4 4 -
results to those which would occur by chance . Assume that 
a consumer has to choose a brand out of four avai lable 
brands ,. and one of the brands is closer to his ideal than 
the others . I f  the consumer knows nothing at all about 
the brands , he should make the "best"  choice 2 5 %  of the 
time . I f  the consumer must choose one from eight brands , 
he wil l  be right 12 . 5 % of the time . But assume that the 
consumer is provided with information in the eight brand 
case and makes the right choice 2 0 %  rather than 12 . 5 % of 
the time . It then cannot be said that more information is 
worse because in the four brand case the ignorant consumer 
was right 2 5 %  of the time and in the eight brand case 
the informed consumer was right only 2 0 %  of the time . 
What you must s ay is that the information he lped in the 
eight brand case because the consumer did 7 . 5 % better than 
he would have done if he had no information at a11 . 
Jacoby , however , s aid in effect that more information is 
worse because in the eight brand case the consumer was 
- 4 5 -
ri ght only 2 0 %  of the time . In fact , it turns out that 
when Jacoby ' s  data are corrected to take into account the 
effects of chance , more information improved the quality 
of decisions in about every case . For a representative 
sample of the critics � Staelin and Payne , Studies of 
the Information-Seeking Behavior of Consumers in COGNITION 
AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 185  ( J . S .  Carroll and J .  W .  Payne , 
eds . 1 9 7 6 ) ; Russ o ,  More Information Is Better : A 
Reevaluation of Jacoby , Speller and Kohn , 1 J .  CONS . RES . 
6 8  ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; Summers , Less Informat ion I s  Better? , 1 1  J .  MKT � 
- RES . 4 6 7  ( 19 7 4 ) ;  Wi lkie , Analysis of Effects of Information 
Load , id . at 4 6 2  ( 19 74 ) . 
6 9 . I f  the government decided to make price information 
available , it should allow firms freely to cut the prices 
they quote to the agency collecting and publishing price 
data . Experimental studies show that equi librium prices 
are higher , other things equal , when firms are required 
to maintain posted prices for s pe ci fied periods . See 
- 4 6 -
J .  Hong and c .  P lott , Implications of Rate Filing For 
Domestic Dry Bulk Transportation on Inland Waters : An 
Experimental Approach , Cali fornia Institute of Technology , 
Soci al S cience Working Paper # 1 6 4  ( 1 9 76 ) . 
70 . The methods and difficulties of modern disclosure 
law are .thoughtfully explored in P .  KEETON and M .  SHAPO , 
supra note 6 2 , and Landers and Rohner ,  A Functional 
Analys is of Truth in Lending ( forthcoming, 1 9 7 9 ) . The 
most important Federal statutes which require standardi z ation 
as a means of facilitating comparison shopping are the 
Truth In Lending Law , which requires the price of money 
to be quoted in standard fashion , and the Fair Packaging 
and Labe ling Act , 15 u . s . c . A .  § 1 4 5 1 , 1 4 5 3 , which requires 
disclosure of the net contents of each "packaged consumer 
commodity . "  The comparison shopping goal of the former 
statute , however ,  has apparently become subordinated to 
the goal of requiring firms to di sclose information which 
- 4 7 -
a hypothetical consumer might consider important or 
useful . See Landers , Some Re flections on Truth in 
Lending , 1 9 7 7  U . Ill . L .  F .  6 6 9 . For reasons which s!Duld 
by now be p lain , this is an inappropriate goal for 
dis clos ure legis lation . In addition , the Truth In 
Lending Law does not require standardization of the 
language in which its required term disclosures must 
appear . See Landers and Rohner ,  supra . 
7 1 .  See . Landers , Determining the Finance Charge Under 
the Truth in Lending Act , 1 AM .  BAR FOUND . RES . J .  4 5  
( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
72 . See Schwartz , supra note 14 . 
7 3 .  The doctrine of strict li ability in tort also arose 
partly as a response to a consumer ' s  supposed inability 
to appreciate the risks of purchasing consumer goods . 
See authorities cited note 1 ,  supra . 
- 4 8-
74 . 15 u . s . c .A .  § 15 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . 
75 . See Posner , A Statistical Study of Antitrust 
Enforcement , 13 J .  LAW AND ECON . 3 6 5 , 3 8 1 ( 1 9 70 ) . 
Judgments obtained by the Government in antitrust 
actions create prima facie civi l  cases against defendants 
on the issue of liability . 15 u . s . c .  § 16 ( c )  ( 19 7 0 ) . 
Bills have been introduced in Congress to authori z e  con-
sumers to bring private suits against firms found by the 
F . T . C ,  to have committed unfair trade practices or to 
have violated F . T . C .  cease and desist orders . See 
CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS , AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 
Legislative Analysis No . 8 ( 1 9 7 7 )  • Although evaluation 
of these bills is beyond our s cope , we note that passage 
of them could obviate some of the difficulties discussed 
here . 
76 . Institutional l itigators , such as the F . T . C .  or 
the Uni form Cons umer Credit Code ' s  Administrator (who is 
-49-
authorized to seek inj unctions against "unconscionable 
terms or provis ions of consumer credit transactions " 
UCCC § §  6 . 1 0 3 ,  6 . 10 4 , 6 . 11 1 ) , would have the resources 
to try the information issue fully . Thus , courts could 
have complete records in those cases to which institutional 
litigators are parties . Nevertheles s , for the reasons 
the text next gives , a j udicial response would be 
uns atis factory even in such cases . 
77 . Section 2 3 7  of the RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
may be exp licable as pursuing the goal of greater contract 
clarity by the method of j udicial excision of contract 
clauses . Subsection ( 3 )  provides that a term is 
unenforceable i f  the party relying on it had " reason to 
know" that the other party "be lieves or assumes that the 
writing does not contain " the term . 
7 8 .  A Day and Brandt survey , conducted in 1 9 6 7 , reported 
that 79 . 7 % of consumers sampled in states other than 
-s o -
California and 8 0 . 1% of consumers sampled in Cal ifornia 
knew that banks and credit unions charged lower rates than 
loan or finance companies . Day and Brandt , supra note 4 2 , 
at 2 3 .  Simi larly , Professor Whitford s urveyed new car 
buyers about the various liabilities manufacturers incurred 
under the standard automobile warranty and then asked these 
buyers to read the warranties . Although a maj ority of 
his s ample could not understand the written warranty , the 
group had a great deal of correct knowledge of the legal 
results the warranty directed.  Whitford , Strict Products 
Li ability And The Automobile Industry : Much Ado About 
Nothing , 19 6 8  WISC . L . REV. 8 3 ,  1 4 6- 5 1 .  These results 
may , obtain because consumers receive information 
from sources additional to their contracts . It therefore 
can be something of a non sequitur to infer consumer 
ignorance from the complexity of contractual language alone . 
- 5 1 -
79 . Professor Posner correctly points out that an 
administrative response would be inadequate unle ss it 
provided incentives to consumers to raise complaints 
and disincentives to firms to pressure the Agency to 
proceed against effe ctive competitors , but he s ays 
that these obj e ctives to some extent are achievable . 
See R .  POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 2 7 2 - 7 3  ( 2d .  ed . 
1 9 7 7 ) . 
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